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CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE EXECUTION 
CHAMBER: WHY DEATH ROW INMATES’ 
SECTION 1983 CLAIMS DEMAND 
REASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE 
PENOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES 
The worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to hate them, 
but to be indifferent to them:  that’s the essence of 
inhumanity.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Lawful capital punishment must be neither reckless nor ignorant in 
its means or ends.2  Historically, excessiveness in capital killings was the 
norm.3  In modern times, by contrast, the death penalty (or aspects 
                                                 
1 George Bernard Shaw, THE DEVIL’S DISCIPLE, act 2 (1901), reprinted in THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, 706 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
2 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (stating that “the existence of the death 
penalty is not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within 
the limit of its imagination”).  But see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) 
(asserting the general concept of legislative deference, which permits judicial intervention 
only in cases where punishments are potentially unconstitutional); John H. Gordon, Jr., 
Note, Criminal Procedure—Capital Punishment—Texas Statutes Amended to Provide for 
Execution by Intravenous Injection of a Lethal Substance, 9 ST. MARY’S L.J. 359, 363 n.47 (1977-
1978): 
When . . . the means adopted [to administer the death penalty] are 
chosen with . . . intent, and are devised for the purpose of reaching the 
end proposed as swiftly and painlessly as possible, . . . they are not 
forbidden by the constitution, although they should be discoveries of 
recent science and never should have been heard of before. 
Gordon, supra (quoting In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210, 210-11 (Mass. 1910)).  Likewise, the risk of 
an accident occurring in the execution process is always present, so the process does not 
need to be flawless for the procedure to be constitutional.  Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 
687 (9th Cir. 1994). 
3 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (prohibiting excessive punishment). Some 
scholars have shown that the Code of Hammurabi, a document roughly 4000 years old, 
was favorable toward capital punishment. Robert J. Sech, Hang ‘Em High: A Proposal for 
Thoroughly Evaluating the Constitutionality of Execution Methods, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 387 
(1995); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 317 n.8 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(describing embellishments on the punishment of death in England, including torture, the 
“Bloody Assizes” of the late fifteenth century, and “attainder”—a decedent’s forfeiture of 
legal rights in property). 
When this country was founded, memories of the Stuart horrors were 
fresh and severe corporal punishments were common. Death was not 
then a unique punishment. The practice of punishing criminals by 
death, moreover, was widespread and by and large acceptable to 
society. Indeed, without developed prison systems, there was 
frequently no workable alternative. 
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thereof) offends the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishment” if it is either grossly disproportionate to the crime 
or criminal involved or does not measurably advance a legitimate 
penological objective when measured against evolving standards of 
decency.4  For roughly the last century, only gross disproportionality, 
one of the Eighth Amendment’s two prohibitions, has been expounded 
upon in death penalty jurisprudence.5  This Note proposes, instead, that 
addressing legitimate penological interests should be the next focus of 
capital punishment jurisprudence.6 
Recent death row inmates’ Section 1983 civil rights causes of action 
suggest that penological objectives must be adequate responses to 
specific Eighth Amendment allegations.7  Section 1983 claims concern 
inmate “circumstances of confinement,” which, when interpreted 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); Marla L. Domino & Marcus T. Boccaccin, Doubting 
Thomas: Should Family Members of Victims Watch Executions?, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 59, 
61-63 (2000). From the mid-1600s to the late 1800s, when guillotine, quartering, stoning, 
whipping, and hanging executions were common, public executions were a community 
event where, “much like a county fair, . . . it was common for families to attend . . . 
together, children and picnic basket in tow.”  Domino & Boccaccin, supra, at 62.  
“Punishment philosophy hinged upon humiliation of the accused—undoubtedly 
stimulated by audiences anxiously awaiting remorse-laden confessions by the criminal.”  
Id. 
4 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4.  The Eighth 
Amendment reads: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  See Abdur’Rahman v. 
Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005)  (describing the components of method-of-
execution analysis). 
5 See Timothy S. Kearns, Note, The Chair, The Needle, and the Damage Done: What the 
Electric Chair and the Rebirth of the Method-of-Execution Challenge Could Mean for the Future of 
the Eighth Amendment, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 197, 198-99 (2005).  See infra Part II.B.2. 
6 See discussion infra Parts III, IV. 
7 See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004).  “[Section] 1983 would be an 
appropriate vehicle for an inmate who is not facing execution to bring a ‘deliberate 
indifference’ challenge . . . .  We see no reason on the face of the complaint to treat 
prisoner’s claim differently solely because he has been condemned to die.”  Id. at 644-45.  
United States Code Section 1983 (as amended in 1871) states, in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  See infra Part II.C.2. 
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simultaneously with the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment,” permit 
inmates to challenge the extra-punishment components of their 
executions.8  The theme of this Note is that Section 1983 nuances on 
death penalty procedures must in turn alter Eighth Amendment 
analysis, correcting a traditionally narrow-minded conception of 
“legitimate penological interests” under habeas jurisprudence while 
retaining the essence of longstanding method-of-execution formulae.9  
Within that proposed framework, every condition or aspect of a death 
row inmate’s treatment, prior to the necessary pains attendant to death 
itself, which itself presents an unnecessary and substantial risk of pain 
and suffering, should be strictly penological and legitimately necessary 
to be justly imposed.10 
To reach a conclusion favoring only legitimate penological interests 
over alleged Eighth Amendment deprivations, this Note first describes 
the background of capital punishment jurisprudence, particularly its 
development from Eighth Amendment claims brought by writ of habeas 
corpus to more recent accommodations for Eighth Amendment claims 
brought by Section 1983, followed by other developments relevant to 
Section 1983 that affect the death penalty.11  The following analysis 
chronicles the significant changes which Section 1983 capital punishment 
litigation permits, specifically, a more responsible notion of “legitimate 
penological interests.”12  The final portion of this Note offers a judicial 
test to weigh the constitutional rights of condemned prisoners against 
the government’s procured penological interests.13  The proposed test 
concludes with some specific challenges for judges, lawmakers, and 
                                                 
8 Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (explaining conditions or circumstances 
of confinement actions). 
The final principle inherent in the [cruel and unusual punishment] 
Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive.  A 
punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary: The 
infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with 
human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of 
suffering. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (considering 
challenges to extra-punishment conditions).  See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
9 See discussion infra Part II.B.3 (introducing traditional death penalty penological 
interests). 
10 See discussion  infra Part III.A. 
11 See discussion infra Part II. 
12 See discussion infra Part III. 
13 See infra Part IV. 
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administrators toward the end of advancing both legitimate penological 
interests and death row inmates’ constitutional and civil rights.14 
II.  BACKGROUND 
What follows is essentially a chronological overview of capital 
punishment jurisprudence.  Part II.A describes an overarching 
competition and balance between prisoners’ constitutional rights and the 
governmental right to impose the death penalty and defines “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”15  Part II.B discusses the traditional judicial 
analysis for death row inmates’ claims for post-conviction relief, which 
challenge capital punishment as a whole, in part to demonstrate that 
test’s compatibility with present-day challenges to pre-punishment 
conditions of confinement.16  Finally, Part II.C charts the development of 
legitimate penological interests in the realm of conditions of confinement 
challenges, which, in addition to the traditional Eighth Amendment 
analysis, gives context to the recent death penalty conditions decisions 
explained thereafter.17 
A. An Introduction to the Eighth Amendment and Other Basic Rights of 
Prisoners 
Death row inmates do not by virtue of their guilt forfeit their 
constitutional rights entirely.18  From very early on, several states 
prohibited certain torturous or inhumane forms of execution.19  In light 
                                                 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See infra Part II.A. 
16 See infra Part II.B. 
17 See infra Part II.C. 
18 E.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (stating that prisoners retain First 
Amendment rights where not inconsistent with inmate status or legitimate penological 
objectives). See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 61 (3d ed. 2001).  A person’s constitutional rights are entitlements 
safeguarded by substantive and procedural due process of the Fifth Amendment (applied 
to federal government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (applied to states), unless and until 
properly denied.  Id.  “[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments clearly countenance the 
death penalty [, yet] [b]oth provide that no person shall be deprived ‘of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.’”  Id. 
19 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that, 
in 1776, Virginia, followed quickly by other states, first adopted the English Bill of Rights of 
1689 and did so verbatim); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 61.  Among the first and 
only recorded prohibitions of inhumane punishment in the United States, prior to the Bill 
of Rights being enacted in 1791, was elimination of the death penalty by live burning of 
female felons in 1790.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 61.  Capital punishment was 
used prior to and after the Bill of Rights was ratified with only Eighth Amendment-type 
cruel and unusual punishment limitations.  Id. 
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of more standardized and expansive Bill of Rights’ guarantees which 
followed, the Supreme Court has said that prisoners reserve whatever 
rights are not reasonably taken away in furtherance of penological 
objectives.20  Of these rights, capital punishment precedent has tended to 
consider only death row prisoners’ Eighth Amendment freedom from 
“cruel and unusual punishment.”21 
Though it evades exact definition, unconstitutional cruel and 
unusual punishment has been summed up as the calculated infliction of 
either unnecessary pain and suffering or lingering death.22  When 
                                                 
20 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 
(1890) and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879), each prescribing the penological 
justification component); see Pell, 417 U.S. at 822 (stating that penological interests are 
legislative objectives provided to correctional systems administrators as the authority to 
divest prisoners of various rights); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (“Lawful 
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.”); BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “penology” as either the study of criminal 
punishment—of deterrence, rehabilitation, reform, and prison management—or as a 
branch of criminology dealing with penal institutions).  See generally COYNE & ENTZEROTH, 
supra note 18 (regarding retained prisoners’ rights). 
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment was directly adopted from the English Declaration of Rights in 1689, 
which in turn was based upon the Magna Carta.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).  See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
22 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958).  Cruel and unusual punishment is whatever 
is unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or is otherwise “calculated to cause 
unnecessary pain or lingering death.”  Gordon, supra note 2, at 360 (citing Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135).  See also 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 279. The terms “cruel” and “unusual” are intentionally not static 
references to only that which was considered unlawfully inhumane at the time the 
Constitution was framed.  Id.  “The Clause may be therefore progressive, and is not 
fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened 
by a humane justice.”  Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).  “The question, in 
any event, is of minor significance; this Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning 
of the Clause simply by parsing its words.”  Furman, 408 U.S. at 277.  By this model, the 
concepts of cruelty and unusual punishment, if courts are so urged by the public sentiment, 
could certainly regress, as occurred, for example, when the electric chair was first 
implemented to execute William Kemmler in New York in 1890.  See Kearns, supra note 5, 
at 200-01, n.38 (describing the attention drawn to electrocution by celebrities like Thomas 
Edison).  Kemmler’s execution, and many electrocutions that followed, occurred at a time 
when the nation was fascinated with the scientific innovation the electric chair represented, 
though most courts and laypeople alike knew very little about the properties of electricity 
and its effect on human bodies.  Id.; CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN 
UNNATURAL HISTORY 67-88 (1999) (chronicling the “Battle of the Currents,” from 
electrocution’s testing phase on horses, calves, and dogs to its human application).  
According to the New York Supreme Court at the time, “[I]t detracts nothing from the force 
of the evidence in favor of this conclusion that we do no know the nature of electricity, nor 
how it is transmitted in currents, nor how it operates to destroy the life of animals and men 
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initially adapted from English law, the words “cruel” and “unusual” 
merely explained one another; whereas, today, these words have 
independent significance.23 Far from prohibiting only torture or physical 
barbarity, cruel punishment is essentially any which is wantonly or 
recklessly inflicted.24  Unusual punishment is punishment not 
standardized in policy or procedure to eliminate the serious risk of 
unnecessary pain and suffering.25  In sum, in Coker v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court declared cruel and unusual punishment coextensive with 
excessiveness, in that excessive punishment either does not contribute  to 
                                                                                                             
exposed to its force.”  Kearns, supra note 5, at 201 (quoting People ex. rel. Kemmler v. 
Durston, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889)).  Upon review of the decision, a higher 
court described the state Supreme Court’s lack of objective skepticism as alarming.  Id. 
23 Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original 
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 860 (1969).  The framers’ use of “cruel and unusual” did not 
intend to categorically deny any method of punishment, only “severe punishment 
unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose.”  Id.  At that 
time, the phrase implied simple illegality and did not carry the same connotations of 
barbarity as today.  Id.  Indeed, the seventeenth century definition of “cruel” merely meant 
severe or hard.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 318-19 n.13 (Marshall, J., concurring).  But see Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that, separately, the words 
“cruel” and “unusual” mean nothing of constitutional significance).  According to the 
concurrence in Walton, a proportionality of sentencing case, the only “excessive” 
punishment is both cruel and unusual and no amount of one can compensate for the lack of 
the other.  Id.  “[T]hat is to say, the text [of the Eighth Amendment] did not prohibit a 
traditional form of a punishment that is rarely imposed, as opposed to a form of 
punishment that is not traditional.  Id. 
24 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (holding that cruelty includes not torture alone but also 
whatever is “inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of 
life”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (not only about deciphering what is “barbarous”); Furman, 408 
U.S. at 322 (Marshall, J., concurring).  The Supreme Court said in Louisiana ex rel Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947), that “[t]he cruelty against which the Constitution 
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the 
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.”  
Gordon, supra note 2, at 359 n.5.  See also id. at 360 n.12 (providing examples of execution 
methods that have been termed “torturous punishment” and were thus rather swiftly 
prohibited in the United States, including: drawing and quartering, cutting off ears and 
limbs, burning alive, starvation, boiling alive, and disemboweling). 
25 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958).  “If the word ‘unusual’ is to have any 
meaning apart from the word ‘cruel,’ . . . the meaning should be the ordinary one, 
signifying something different from that which is generally done.”  Id.  See also Furman, 408 
U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing how procedures are “unusual” if they 
discriminate upon either an unlawful basis such as race or a lawful basis like social class or 
wealth); Granucci, supra note 23, at 860 (explaining “usual” punishment as proven, codified 
punishment); Gordon, supra note 2, at 363 n.46 (“The word ‘unusual’ . . . cannot be taken so 
broadly as to prohibit every humane improvement not previously known.”); Constitutional 
Law—Second Electrocution Attempt Not Violation of Constitutional Prohibition against Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment, 33 VA. L. REV. 348, 349 (1947) [hereinafter Second Electrocution Attempt] 
(“[B]ut punishment that is greater than has been described, known or inflicted is cruel and 
unusual.”). 
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a legitimate penological objective, as when it results in a serious risk of 
gratuitous pain or suffering, or makes a criminal’s sentence grossly 
disproportionate to his or her wrongdoing.26  Regarding execution 
specifically, “cruel and unusual” likewise encompasses whatever surplus 
risk of pain and suffering unnecessarily accompanies the death penalty, 
where unjustified by legitimate penological interests.27 
B. Traditional Method-of-Execution Analysis during Habeas Corpus Primacy 
To safeguard the Eighth Amendment rights of condemned persons, 
the Supreme Court has traditionally relied upon a three-part “method-
of-execution” balancing test.28  Method-of-execution analysis considers 
the following: (1) evolving societal standards of decency; (2) the 
appropriate proportion of a criminal’s sentence compared to the crime(s) 
committed; and (3) the legitimacy of penological objectives for the death 
penalty imposed.29  Although the Court has only intermittently utilized 
this test explicitly over the last century,30 determining cruel and unusual 
                                                 
26 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
27 Id.; see Gordon, supra note 2, at 364 (“The substance and procedures selected to 
perform the execution must not inflict undue pain or cause lingering death in order to 
withstand the expected [E]ighth [A]mendment challenge.”); see also Francis, 329 U.S. at 463. 
28 Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879); see 
Kearns, supra note 5, at 198 nn.10-11. 
29 See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005). In practice, the 
standards of decency prong of analysis operates primarily as the measuring stick for what 
constitutes grossly disproportionate punishments.  See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
288 (1983) (holding a seven-time non-violent felony offender unconstitutionally sentenced 
to life imprisonment without parole under the Eighth Amendment).  Otherwise, it 
measures whether a punishment advances acceptable penological objectives.  See Coker, 433 
U.S. at 592 n.4 (citing the legislative decisions of States and foreign countries aggregately, 
holding that the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was deemed both grossly 
disproportionate and a failed rationale when tested for being “an indispensable part of the 
States’ criminal justice system”); see also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 61. 
30 The first, most explicit invocation of this Eighth Amendment balance was the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkerson v. Utah, in 1879, to declare Utah’s firing squad an 
unconstitutional method of execution.  99 U.S. 130 (1879).  Although the analysis was not 
ignored wholesale in the century that followed, post-Wilkerson, the Supreme Court avoided 
making any further method-of-execution resolutions until its 2005 decision of Roper v. 
Simmons.  543 U.S. 551 (2005).  Kearns, supra note 5, at 198-99. 
In assessing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the Supreme 
Court has taken a number of methods: . . . in death penalty cases, 
whether the method of executing the death sentence is cruel and 
unusual.  This last category, which is termed method-of-execution 
analysis, has largely languished at the Supreme Court level, with no 
cases directly engaging in method-of execution analysis in 115 years. 
Id.  The dearth of method of execution claims is difficult to explain since Trop, however, as 
all the Circuit courts have agreed that Trop’s standards of decency test applies to the 
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punishment has essentially remained the same, largely owing to the fact 
that, historically, death row inmates’ sole cause of action was the petition 
for writ of habeas corpus.31  The following sub-sections examine the 
prevailing habeas and method-of-execution avenue for death penalty 
relief. 
1. Standards of Decency 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence prescribes consideration of 
societal values because, in actuality, the values of citizens continually 
temper governmental interests.32  Early on, the Supreme Court had ruled 
on various occasions that torturous forms of punishment were inherently 
indecent; the de facto measurement for Eighth Amendment violations 
was the Justice’s own judgment.33  Bearing heavily on judicial 
interpretations were the press and public, who had traditionally 
overseen and scrutinized execution proceedings, and, prior to the 1830s, 
were rarely so indirectly involved as to merely cast their ballots for 
legislative decisions on their behalf.34  During the course of the next 
                                                                                                             
methods of implementing executions as opposed to the sentencing phase of a death penalty 
trial.  Id. at 222. 
31 Id. at 198-99.  “Postconviction proceedings are usually seeking a writ of habeas corpus, 
and the terms will be used interchangeably in this section.”  LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN 
KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 197 (2004) (commenting on the 
symbiosis between habeas and post-conviction relief).  See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases 
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2000).  “Habeas corpus,” in Latin, means “have the body.”  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra 
note 18, at 755.  The purpose of habeas challenges, like others for state post-conviction 
relief, focuses on “whether or not a conviction and sentence has been illegally obtained.”  
Id. at 730 n.3.  Claims challenging the very fact of an impending death penalty upon oneself 
or the length of time one is imprisoned for are core to habeas corpus and must be brought 
under the habeas statute, Section 2254.  Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).  But see Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).  Eighth 
Amendment claims fall outside the core of habeas where an inmate seeks injunctive relief 
from being executed by the state “in the manner they currently intend . . . . [where] the 
anticipated protocol allegedly causes ‘a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and unnecessary’ 
pain.”  Id. 
32 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The Amendment must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”) 
(emphasis added); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating that generalized 
opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily in determining contemporary standards of 
decency as the public attitude toward a given sanction); see also Kearns, supra note 5, at 200-
01, 202 n.38 (describing society’s enamorment with the electric chair and New York courts’ 
uncritical employment of the chair). 
33 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 360. 
34 Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 63 (describing a significant history of public 
attendance at executions prior to the electric chair and how clergy or public officials often 
explained to attendees their integral role as witnesses).  Public attendance of this vigor 
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century, however, jurisdictions nationwide restructured executions so as 
to restrict admission of public witnesses by means of private execution 
statutes and the decision to move the death penalty into small, inner 
chambers.35  Despite the less direct public involvement in the death 
penalty that ensued, maturing societal conceptions of human dignity 
have periodically caused state and federal judiciaries to reconsider their 
approaches toward capital punishment and to implement more humane 
methods of execution.36 
                                                                                                             
remains the norm in the trial context.  The Supreme Court, in Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia, recognized that public access to the judicial processes has a “specific structural 
significance” in assuring “fair and accurate adjudication” and is supported by “the weight 
of historical practice.”  448 U.S. 555, 594, 598 (1980).  Additionally, that Court held that 
“[s]ecrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process,” and 
“[p]ublic access is essential . . . if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of maintaining 
public confidence in the administration of justice.”  Id. at 595.  Consequently, the public’s 
right and interest in access to trials cannot be obviated unless there is a compelling 
government interest, narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  Id.; Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
35 Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 63.  States in the Northeast began the move to 
privatize executions, and nationwide this shift was nearly complete by the early 1900s.  Id. 
at 63; see also John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a First 
Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 361-62 (2000).  The last 
two recorded public executions were in August 1936 and May 1937. Domino & Boccacin¸ 
supra, at 64.  But see id. at 63 (describing several instances in the 1800s in which executions 
of infamous criminals revitalized public interest in executions, at times drawing viewers in 
the tens of thousands, thus challenging the premise of limited attendance regulations); 
Robert Perry Barnidge, Jr., Comment, Death Watch: Why America was not Allowed to Watch 
Timothy McVeigh Die, 3 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 193 (describing how thousands of interested 
families of victims of the Oklahoma City bombings were not allowed to watch the federal 
execution of domestic terrorist Timothy McVeigh in 2001).  See, e.g., COYNE & ENTZEROTH, 
supra note 18, at 76.  Today, most capital punishment jurisdictions specify a finite number 
of persons who may attend executions, according to their relationship to the offender, the 
offender’s victim(s), and the correctional system.  Domino & Boccaccin, supra, at 64.  
Approximately twelve states regulate attendance by quantity alone and not by function.  Id. 
at 64 nn.37-38.  One such private execution statute, the Texas Department of Corrections 
Procedures for the Execution of Inmates Sentenced to Death (protocol dating back to Texas’ 
adoption of lethal injection in 1982) provides that the only personnel permitted at an 
execution are the Huntsville warden’s own operations personnel, a medically trained 
individual (not to be identified), certain designated members of the press, a justice of the 
peace, an attending physician, an inmate’s chaplain (if so desired), and certain other state 
delegates.  Id. 
36 See Casey Lynne Ewart, Use of The Drug Pavulon in Lethal Injections: Cruel and 
Unusual?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1159, 1162 (2006) (arguing that America’s preferred 
methods of execution have always changed “[a]s a result of . . . public distaste” or due to 
“the public’s focus shifted from punishment to rehabilitation,” or for like reasons).  
Preferred methods of execution in “Post-Revolutionary America” evolved in this order: 
hanging, the electric chair, lethal gas, firing squad, and lethal injection.  Id. at 1162-66.  See 
also infra note 233. 
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Guided by earlier judicial ideals, the Court determined in Trop v. 
Dulles, in 1958, that method-of-execution analysis is concerned with an 
execution method’s humaneness in light of “the dignity of man” and the 
“evolving standards of decency . . . of a maturing society.”37 Evolving 
standards of decency analysis evaluates the public consciousness 
through the aggregate position of state legislatures as objective criteria 
and both international law and a court’s own sense of substantial shifts 
within and among the states as subjective criteria.38  The subjective 
inquiries were retained to champion society’s death penalty influence 
and its maturation in the event that society’s progress conflicts with 
lethargic legislative standards.39 
                                                 
37 356 U.S 86, 100-01 (1958).  In doing so, the Supreme Court in Trop reiterated a much 
earlier Supreme Court decision to consider evolving concepts of human justice in Eighth 
Amendment analysis, that of Weems v. United States.  217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).  The Court in 
Trop, however, elaborated significantly upon the concept  of decency proposed in Weems: 
[T]he death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, 
in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the 
constitutional concept of cruelty.  But it is equally plain that the 
existence of the death penalty is not a license for the Government to 
devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its 
imagination. . . .  The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment 
is nothing less than the dignity of man.  While the State has the power 
to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be 
exercised within the limits of civilized standards. . .  The Court 
recognized in [Weems] that the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are 
not precise, and that their scope is not static.  The Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society. 
356 U.S. at 99-101; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-71 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (advocating prohibition of uncivilized and inhuman punishment which are an 
affront to human dignity). 
38 Kearns, supra note 5, at 214; see Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and 
the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV 1245, 1246 (1973-1974) (stating that both the concurring 
and dissenting justices in Furman accepted Weems’ and Trop’s “evolving standards of 
decency” as the appropriate test but disagreed about the role of public sentiment and 
public opinion polls in determining those standards).  When subjectively weighing 
substantial shifts among state legislatures, “[i]t is not so much the number of these States 
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 315 (2003).  As to international standards, some have argued that the United 
States’ contemporary standards on the death penalty violate her treaty obligations.  Hill v. 
McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006) (Brief of Amicus Curiae, Human Rights Advocates, 
Human Rights Watch, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, in Support of 
Petitioner Hill). 
39 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (“Thus, in cases involving a consensus, our own judgment is 
‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached 
by the citizenry and its legislators.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) 
(overruling Atkins to the extent that it authorized judicial discretion only in certain cases, 
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Eventually, a much narrower view of evolving societal standards of 
decency was popularized by the Supreme Court case of Penry v. 
Lynaugh.40  There, the Court traded out Trop’s “human dignity” and 
“evolving standards of decency” for a more simplistic “contemporary 
standards of decency” analysis.41  The Penry analysis avoids Trop’s 
subjective factors and instead regards the aggregate legal or formal 
position of all state and federal execution statutes as the sine qua non of 
standards of decency.42  Roper v. Simmons, decided in 2005, has since been 
the only Supreme Court decision to overtly employ the “evolving 
                                                                                                             
instead stating that judicial recognition of substantial shifts is always constitutional); see 
also Furman, 408 U.S. at 277, 299, 300 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
40 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). 
41 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01; Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.  “The clearest and most reliable 
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.”  Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.  Penry additionally considered objectively the actions 
of sentencing juries in determining whether mentally incapacitated persons could be 
executed.  Id. at 331.  The shift from evolving to contemporary standards was likely 
simultaneous with a shift in Supreme Court majorities.  See Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 
38, at 1246-47, n.14 (comparing various concurring and dissenting justices in Furman for 
their views on the appropriate factors for determining standards of decency).  For instance, 
in his concurrence to Furman, Justice Brennan opined: 
A third principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment 
must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.  Rejection by 
society, of course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does 
not comport with human dignity . . . .  Legislative authorization, of 
course, does not establish acceptance.  The acceptability of a severe 
punishment is measured, not by its availability, for it might become so 
offensive to society as never to be inflicted, but by its use . . . .  The 
objective indicator of society’s view of an unusually severe 
punishment is what society does with it, and today society will inflict 
death upon only a small sample of the eligible criminals.  Rejection 
could hardly be more complete without becoming absolute.  At the 
very least, I must conclude that contemporary society views this 
punishment with substantial doubt. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 277, 279, 300. 
42 Penry, 492 U.S. at 331; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (a prodigy of Penry analysis).  A 
recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision adhering to contemporary standards of decency 
relied on three indicators that lethal injection is proper: first, that lethal injection is 
“commonly thought to be the most humane form of execution;” second, that thirty-seven of 
thirty-eight death penalty jurisdictions prefer lethal injection; and third, that no court has 
ever held lethal injection as a method to be cruel and unusual punishment.  Abdur’Rahman 
v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306-07 (Tenn. 2005).  But see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (there the 
Supreme Court indicated only that Penry’s demand for “objective factors” circumscribed 
broader evolving standards in proportionality review cases) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)); Kearns, supra note 5, at 222 (noting that all Circuit courts have 
stated this same proposition as Atkins).  See generally Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 
S.W.3d 173, 186 (Ky. 2003); Cooper v. Rimmer, 358 F.3d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. 
Webb, 750 A.2d 448, 457-58 (Conn. 2000) (describing at length the lethal injection legislation 
in thirty-four states). 
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standards of decency” analysis in lieu of Penry’s “contemporary 
standards of decency” analysis.43 
The significance of the Trop/Penry distinction remains potent today.  
After Trop, lethal injection became the preferred method of execution in 
most jurisdictions.44  Lethal injection is touted as the best assurance of 
humane execution,45 owing largely to its likeness to medical 
procedures.46  The method also requires a great deal of technical skill; 
however, states have had an increasingly difficult time enlisting medical 
                                                 
43 543 U.S. 551, 562-63 (2005) (stating that the Court in Atkins did not solidify whether or 
not the Court’s independent judgment could be a factor in determining standards of 
decency, this Court opted to return to earlier precedent, namely Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977)).  Coker stated: “[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty 
under the Eighth Amendment.”  Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).  Roper, being thus 
far a rare exception to Penry analysis, has been chastised for its return to international law 
considerations and judicial discretion in noting substantial shifts in society.  Kearns, supra 
note 5, at 199-200. 
44 FREDERICK DRIMMER, UNTIL YOU ARE DEAD: THE BOOK OF EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 75 
n.2 (Carol Publishing Group 1990).  New York’s Death Commission, in the 1880s, was the 
first in any state to consider using lethal injection, though it ultimately decided to 
implement electrocution instead.  Id.  In 1977, Oklahoma was the first state to implement 
lethal injection.  Id. at 75-76.  Presently, thirty-seven states, the U.S. federal government, 
and the U.S. military authorize capital punishment by statute.  Ewart, supra note 36, at 1159, 
n.2.  Lethal injection is the preferred option, if not the only option, for execution in each of 
these jurisdictions except Nebraska (authorizing only the electric chair).  Id. at 1169-82.  As 
of 2001, twenty states offered, by statute, at least two constitutional methods-of-execution.  
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 80.  In addition to the thirty-eight jurisdictions that 
then provided for lethal injection (thirty-seven today), eleven permitted electrocution, three 
permitted hanging, three permitted the firing squad, and five permitted lethal gas as 
methods of execution.  Id. at 91-105 (citing Jacob Weisberg, This is Your Death, in THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, July 1, 1991 [hereinafter Weisberg]). 
45 COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 103 (citing Weisberg, supra note 44).  See, e.g., 
Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 906-07 (6th Cir. 2007); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 
S.W.3d 292, 306-07 (Tenn. 2005). 
46 Ewart, supra note 36, at 1166 n.77 (citing Meghan S. Skelton, Lethal Injection in the Wake 
of Fierro v. Gomez, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2 (1997)).  Dr. Stanley Deutch developed the 
current form of lethal injection in 1977 at the Anesthesiology Department of Oklahoma 
University.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 83 (citing Weisberg, supra note 44).  The 
most popular lethal injection machine in use today, however, was developed by Dr. Fred 
Leuchter at the behest of the New Jersey Department of Corrections to help eliminate 
accidents.  Id. at 104.  For a detailed description of the machine, see id. at 123 (citing the 
Lethal Injection Manual for the State of Missouri, Fred A. Leuchter Associates, Inc., describing 
the delivery module and the manufacturer’s suggested procedure).  As in medical 
procedures, lethal injection protocols have accounted for some or all of the following, to 
some degree: the step-by-step of the procedure to be undertaken; the qualifications, 
training, and description of duties for team members; monitoring and contemporaneous 
records of each step in the procedure; and guidelines for selecting, obtaining, storing, and 
disposing properly of intravenous chemicals.  See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d  896, 902 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
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practitioners’ assistance in the procedure because most consider 
effectuating death by any means an ethical conflict of interest.47  With 
lethal injection instead being administered by corrections officials, 
whether or not lethal injection remains largely judgment-proof may well 
depend on whether the courts adhere to “contemporary” or “evolving” 
standards of decency.48 
2. Proportional Death Sentencing 
A cruel and unusual death sentence is one “grossly 
disproportionate” to the legitimate penological objectives and/or 
standards of decency before a court.49  In the lethal injection era, 
                                                 
47 Colin Miller, A Death by Any Other Name: The Federal Government’s Inconsistent 
Treatment of Drugs Used in Lethal Injections and Physician-Assisted Suicide, in 17 J. L. & 
HEALTH 221, 234-35 (2002-2003).  The American Medical Association (AMA) adopted 
formal rules of ethics, derived in part from the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), prohibiting physician-assisted suicide and in part from the 
predominant understanding of the Hippocratic Oath—”[first], do no harm”—stating that 
assisting in the performance of capital punishment would be a serious ethical breach.  Id.  
For instance, in California, two anesthesiologists refused to participate, citing ethical 
reasons, in the execution of Michael Angelo Morales on the eve of his February, 2006 
execution.  Ewart, supra note 36, at 1189-90.  Nevertheless, in the absence of willing licensed 
physicians, the Eastern District of Virginia has simply assumed that, “for exceedingly 
practical reasons,” the standard of care owed in lethal injection is reduced below that owed 
in hospitals.  Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 543 n.5, 553 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing 
Workman, 486 F.3d at 910).  The Eleventh Circuit in Abdur’Rahman likewise held that 
denying prison wardens the authority to “obtain, mix, and administer a controlled 
substance . . . . would risk frustrating the Tennessee General Assembly’s considered 
decision to adopt execution by lethal injection as the primary method of execution in 
Tennessee.”  Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 313, 314.  Even so, that same court attempted to 
attract medical technicians by guaranteeing their immunity from suit, asserting that 
executions fall outside the purview of licensing statutes.  Id. 
48 See Miller, supra note 47, at 231-33 (reporting at least thirty-one botched executions 
between the nation’s first lethal injection in 1982 and 2001).  Three things are primarily to 
blame for these failures: “a wide variance in the drugs and dosages used in different 
states,” “that many states do not provide adequate instructions for executioners,” and 
“untrained executioners,” which compounds the inadequate instructions problem.  Id. at 
232-33. 
49 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).  Proportionality is not a simple weighing of 
facts in each state.  Post-Furman reforms show that states had assumed one of three 
sentencing patterns: mandatory death penalty sentencing for specific crimes (no discretion 
intended), aggravating or mitigating factors for the trier of fact to consider (limiting and 
controlling discretion), or mandatory death penalty sentencing if certain aggravating 
factors are present (a combination of the other two).  William R. Taylor, Comment, Criminal 
Law—Capital Punishment—The Texas Statutes Authorizing the Death Penalty Do Not Violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 170, 
177 (1975-1976).  The outer bounds of unnecessary or arbitrary proportionality 
determinations are by no means easy to determine.  See Kearns, supra note 5, at 200.  “As a 
result of the Court’s 115 year refusal to hear method-of-execution cases, there is little or no 
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proportionality has undergone more change than any other branch of 
Eighth Amendment analysis.50  Beginning with United States v. Furman in 
1967, the Supreme Court attempted to mitigate arbitrary determinations 
at death penalty sentencing by implementing a temporary nationwide 
moratorium on the death penalty.51  Nevertheless, Furman did not 
profess to end capital punishment itself.  The moratorium was lifted in 
1976 when, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court deemed three states’ death 
penalty standards were no longer arbitrary or unreasonable.52  Since 
1976, nearly all of the changes to Eighth Amendment precedent in 
habeas proceedings have, likewise, regarded proportionality.53  To date, 
Furman’s progeny have held capital punishment to be either inherently 
indecent or lacking penological support—and consequently an 
unconstitutional sentence—for pregnant women, the mentally insane, 
juveniles, and the mentally retarded.54 
                                                                                                             
illustrative precedent to facilitate meaningful understanding of what constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.”  Id. 
50 See, e.g., Kearns, supra note 5, at 206-07.  “[A]fter the progressive standards of Trop 
were announced, the Court seemingly turned its back on method-of-execution analysis, 
instead chipping away (sic) at death-eligible offenses and demographic eligibility for the 
death penalty.”  Id. 
51 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Furman stated, specifically, that pregnant women could not 
rightly be executed under Trop’s standards of decency indicia or in furtherance of 
penological objectives.  Id. at 239-40.  The effect of Furman, cumulatively, was to nullify 
each of the thirty-two state death penalty statutes that existed at the time and retroactively 
free every inmate who was sentenced under those statutes from the threat of execution.  
DRIMMER, supra note 44, at 76.  As shocking an effect as it was, it was not necessarily a 
surprise.  Id.  “Actually, there had been an unofficial moratorium on executions since 1967 
as one legal challenge after another to the death sentence moved through the courts.”  Id.; 
see also Miller, supra note 47, at 225-26 (on ending the capital punishment moratorium). 
52 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).  “No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the 
death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”  Id. at 206-07.  The 
moratorium, a de facto state of affairs since the late 1960s, had formalized primarily to allow 
study into and improvements on state and federal capital punishment statutes, rules, and 
regulations.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 305, 436 n.18.  Thereafter, in Gregg, and in companion 
cases, the Georgia, Texas, and Florida state death penalty statutes and regulations were 
deemed adequately revised to protect against arbitrary jury discretion in death sentencing.  
BRANDON, supra note 22, at 244.  See also Taylor, supra note 49, at 171.  “Furman thus was 
viewed [by the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals in Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1975)] as doing no more than condemning the arbitrary, capricious, and 
standardless manner in which juries had been allowed to impose the death penalty.”  Id. 
53 CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 21.  See supra note 50; infra note 54. 
54 Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 (pregnant women); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) 
(mentally insane); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (mentally retarded); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 
(juveniles).  Although Atkins supported Penry’s contemporary standards of decency 
analysis, it departed on proportionality grounds from Penry’s previous affirmation of the 
death penalty for less-severely mentally retarded persons.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
321 (2003); Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. 
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3. Legitimate Penological Objectives 
Aside from inherent indecency or gross disproportionality, a 
punishment may be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual if it fails to 
advance materially a legitimate penological objective.55  The Supreme 
Court illustrated in Coker that any punishment which fails to meet this 
threshold is “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition 
of pain and suffering.”56 The Supreme Court has required state 
governments to show relevant penological interests when instituting 
capital punishment since the birth of method-of-execution analysis in 
Wilkerson v. Utah and In re Kemmler.57  Currently, courts accept 
penological objectives for the death penalty and the justifications for the 
punishment in its entirety, especially retribution and deterrence.58  This 
is because, under habeas corpus, death row prisoners’ only post-
conviction relief was an equitable stay of execution rather than an 
injunction against specific conditions of confinement.59  Since even one 
stay of execution would erode the states’ retributive and deterrence 
                                                 
55 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (addressing, in particular, how the original 
trier of fact had been given almost standardless discretion to find a convicted rapist of 
adult women worthy of the death sentence).  See supra notes 20, 25 and accompanying text 
(offering definitions and scope for legitimate penological objectives); see also CARTER & 
KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 29 (indicating that some have donned the category of 
punishments which fail for wont of legitimate penological objectives “punishments 
unauthorized by law.”).  See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 360 n.12 (illustrating how, by this 
Coker criterion, torture is inherently indecent). 
56 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.  Actually, Gregg was the first case to elaborate on Justice 
Powell’s dissenting plug for “the ends of penology” in Furman.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83 
(citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 451).  “[T]he sanction imposed cannot be so totally without 
penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”  Id. at 183. 
57 99 U.S. 130 (1879); 136 U.S. 436 (1890).  “The infliction of capital punishment is itself a 
deliberate act, deliberately administered for a penal purpose.”  Taylor v. Crawford, 487 
F.3d 1072, 1081 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991)).  See supra 
note 20. 
58 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183; CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 32. 
59 See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643, 647 (2004). 
Despite its literal applicability . . . § 1983 must yield to the more 
specific habeas statute . . . where an inmate seeks injunctive relief 
challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his 
sentence. . . .  By contrast, constitutional claims that merely challenge 
the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, whether the inmate seeks 
monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of that core and may be 
brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance. . . .  If a request for a 
permanent injunction does not sound in habeas, it follows that the 
lesser-included request for a temporary stay (or preliminary 
injunction) does not either. 
Id. at 643, 647; see supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 111-12 
(discussing the factors for determining whether injunctive stay is appropriate). 
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justifications for death sentencing, courts have jealously guarded 
legislatures’ penological interests by lending them massive deference in 
method-of-execution analysis.60 
Retribution is perhaps the most compelling and longstanding 
penological justification for affirming death penalty sentences and 
among the oldest qualities distinguishing governance from 
statelessness.61  Retribution is the ideological principle that governments 
deserve to resort to capital punishment because society has authorized 
criminal justice as the means of restoring moral balance.62  Entrusting 
                                                 
60 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (noting that federalism and respect 
for the abilities of legislatures are sufficient reasons for due deference to them).  See, e.g., 
Hill v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2556938 *2-4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006); Workman v. Bredesen, 
486 F.3d 896, 904-10 (6th Cir. 2007); Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 550-55 (E.D. 
Va. 2007). 
61 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, n.30.  See, e.g., M.R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities—an 
Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96, 
113-18 (1978) (discussing deterrence, retribution, and moral outrage as a part of 
retribution); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 31 (offering an overview of the death 
penalty interest in retribution); CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 8, 24 (assuming 
categorization of retribution and deterrence as penological interests without comment).  
The Court in Gregg called retribution and deterrence “two principal social purposes” of the 
death penalty.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.  Some death penalty advocates believe retribution is 
the most important justification for capital punishment: 
I would favor retention of the death penalty as retribution even if it 
were shown that the threat of execution could not deter prospective 
murderers not already deterred by the threat of imprisonment. . . .  At 
any rate, the actual monetary costs are trumped by the importance of 
doing justice. . . .  Retribution is an independent moral justification. 
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra, at 16, 17 (quoting Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate 
Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1665-66 (1986) [hereinafter van den Haag]).  
See generally Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3 (explaining when and how public execution 
gave way to private execution).  But see Ewart, supra note 36, at 1162.  Retribution interest 
was partially abandoned when the public began to prefer rehabilitation to punishment in 
the early 1800s.  Id.  The focus on rehabilitation began a movement to create other state-
custody endeavors: penitentiaries, asylums, and the like.  Id.  Notwithstanding its erosion, 
the Supreme Court has noted that, while retribution may not be the “dominant objective” 
of criminal law anymore, it has still been upheld as consistent with “respect for the dignity 
of” all people.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 
(1949)). 
62 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16 (Lexis 2001).  “Retributivists 
believe that punishment is justified when it is deserved.  It is deserved when the 
wrongdoer freely chooses to violate society’s rules.”  Id.  This is the theory of so-called “just 
desserts,” which originated in part from Old Testament references to the “eye for an eye” 
principal, philosophers like Immanuel Kant, and the Biblical concept of lex talionis.  CARTER 
& KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 11, nn.20-23.  But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304-
05 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (critiquing retribution of right and describing society’s 
greater desire for deterrence): 
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government agents with the death penalty task has at least two 
benefits.63  First, capital punishment is how civilized societies attempt to 
dole out vengeance in lieu of personal vendettas and mob justice.64  The 
public at large, in particular the family and friends of an offender’s 
victims, would likely lack the ability or desire to dispassionately, if 
humanely, perform executions.65  Second, capital punishment also grants 
death row inmates a measure of mercy which mob justice would not.66  
                                                                                                             
The only other purpose suggested, one that is independent of 
protection for society, is retribution.  Shortly stated, retribution in this 
context means that criminals are put to death because they deserve 
it . . . .  The claim must be that for capital crimes death alone comports 
with society’s notion of proper punishment. . . .  The asserted public 
belief that murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent 
with the execution of a random few.  As the history of the punishment 
of death in this country shows, our society wishes to prevent crime; we 
have no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them. 
Id.; see id. at 303 (explaining how societies manifest moral outrage toward crime and how 
he believes imprisonment can serve the purpose as effectively as capital punishment). 
63 Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (also cited in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 
n.29): 
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling 
that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an 
important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by 
law.  When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling 
or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 
“deserve,” then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, 
vigilante justice, and lynch law. 
Id.; see also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 28 (recounting a story from RIDEAU & 
WIKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL BEHIND BARS 306-07 (1992) in which, when 
an executioner failed to properly decapitate a woman and gave up in desperation, the 
angry crowd responded by brutally killing him). 
64 Compare Furman, 408 U.S. at 308, with Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
571 (1980).  The Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers justified a public right of open 
access to trials as a prophylactic measure against “vengeful ‘self-help’” and as an outlet for 
societal retribution and closure, much the same reasoning which goes into death penalty 
retribution.  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571. 
65 Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 73-74 (stating that the motivation of family and 
friends of victims to watch a killer’s death may be “revengeful fantasy,” a desire for closure 
and psychological betterment, a sense of justice and safety in the world, or any 
combination thereof).  For these reasons, families of murder victims have largely led the 
legal movement to permit themselves and others like them access to witness executions.  Id. 
at 73. 
66 See Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 38, at 1264-66 (section titled “Levels of Death 
Penalty Attitudes”).  “[S]ome people may favor the idea of capital punishment without 
realizing or without accepting its implications.”  Id.  Another camp, advocates of maximum 
pain, would intentionally implement retribution without pity or dignity in executions, in 
part to make the gruesomeness of the death penalty enterprise, and not merely the 
likelihood of death sentences, a deterrent of violent crimes.  See Gardner, supra note 61, at 
117.  They would add that the death penalty ought to be excruciating, if not humiliating as 
well, for the convict and that, as the likelihood of severe punishment is relaxed, deterrence 
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Along these same lines, condemned criminals are enabled to seek post-
conviction relief, wherein courts attempt to enforce method-of-execution 
constitutional limits on the behavior of government agents.67 
Deterrence is, like retribution, a paramount penological objective for 
the death penalty.68  In theory, deterrence dissuades people from 
committing crimes punishable by death by instilling fear of execution 
where otherwise stiff fines or life imprisonment would be the harshest 
punishments under law.69  This “intimidation” aspect of deterrence is 
intended to affect every segment of society, except for condemned 
criminals themselves, whom the state has manifestly chosen not to 
rehabilitate.70  Aside from its conceded inapplicability to death row 
                                                                                                             
loses its value.  Id.  Fledgling deterrence of the public could be attributed in part to 
increased legal avenues for prisoners, frequently permitted stays of execution, a dramatic 
increase in commutation of death sentences by state governors, and juries’ reluctant use of 
the death penalty, each of which cause most people to forget the connection between the 
crime and punishment.  See Furman, 408 U.S. at 277, 279, 300 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 25-26.  In 1984, the chance of a murderer receiving 
capital punishment was about 1 in 1000.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra, at 26.  This all, of 
course, incorrectly presupposes that the criminal element, those prone to intentional or 
cold-blooded crimes, are in close proximity as witnesses to be personally affected by capital 
punishment.  Id.  Additionally, deterrence is based on a rational connection between 
choices and consequences, whereas evidence suggests that many violent offenders are 
irrational, believing they cannot be caught or perceiving no connection between crime and 
punishment.  Id.  Factors such as these can make the infliction of the sentence so hit-or-miss 
that even violent offenders cannot help but be optimistic about their chances of survival.  
Id.  See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (stating that both petition for habeas 
corpus and Section 1983 actions are avenues available to imprisonment-related 
complaints). 
68 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (deterrence noted as one of “two principal 
social purposes” of the death penalty).  But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300-03 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that no evidence other than the purported 
“common human experience” shows that capital punishment is any more of a deterrent 
than imprisonment to the criminal himself or to others). 
69 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-87 (acknowledging that valuation of deterrence is complex, the 
Court deferred to the legislature, because they are in the better position to study its 
penological value).  To the degree deterrence is plausible, its effectiveness is allegedly not 
minimized by repeated failures in (electrocution) executions, since or as long as such 
failures are too random to be predicted.  Second Electrocution Attempt, supra note 25, at 349.  
“Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is more 
important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because of the possibility, or 
even the probability, that executing them would not deter others.”  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, 
supra note 18, at 16 (quoting van den Haag, supra note 61, at 1662). 
70 CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 31, at 10 (describing intimidation and arguing that 
deterrence aimed at the particular offender is called “specific deterrence”).  Some have 
argued that execution specifically deters prisoners by incapacitation.  Id.  That is, death 
guarantees that that one person will never commit a crime again.  Id.  E.g., Ernest van den 
Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (1986).  “The death penalty 
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inmates, capital punishment’s effectiveness as a deterrent of others 
remains a significant source of academic debate.71  At the very least, 
deterrence varies according to the sentiments of decency in and among 
public sectors.72 
In order to venerate the aims of retribution and deterrence, in 1996 
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) to eliminate undue delays between capital sentencing and 
punishment.73  With rare exception, the AEDPA prevents death row 
                                                                                                             
is our harshest punishment.  It is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished, 
instead of temporarily imprisoning them.”  Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has 
never ranked specific deterrence as a penological interest alongside the other aims of 
deterrence.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 n.28; see also CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra, at 11. 
71 E.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184-85; see infra note 72. 
72 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185.  According to a 1996 survey of academic criminological society 
presidents in this country, 84% believe the death penalty is ineffective as a deterrent to 
murder.  Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
September 27, 2006, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/factsheet.pdf (last visited October 2, 2007) 
[hereinafter DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER].  The evidence suggests that most 
people with calloused and violent predispositions, who may eventually become capital 
punishment’s best candidates, are not measurably deterred even in jurisdictions where 
violent offenders are repeatedly sentenced to death.  Id.; COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 
18, at 26.  “We may nevertheless assume safely there are murderers, such as those who act 
in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect.  But for many 
others, the death penalty undoubtedly, is a significant deterrent.”  Id.  Common use of the 
death penalty has in fact been tied to increased violence and brutalization among the 
public.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra, at 26-28 (citing, in part, Raymond Bonner & Ford 
Fessenden, States With No Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2000, at A1) (noting, among other things, a negative correlation between capital 
punishment and murder rates in ten out of twelve non-death penalty states when 
compared to the national per-capita rates).  Likewise, a 2004 FBI Uniform Crime Report 
explained that where capital punishment is used without the least hesitation, particularly 
in the South, the murder rate nonetheless remains the highest, whereas the opposite is true, 
on both accounts, as to the Northeast.  Facts about the Death Penalty, supra. 
73 The AEDPA provides, in relevant part, the following: 
(b) A stay of execution granted pursuant to subsection (a) shall expire 
if— 
(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus application 
under section 2254 within the time required in section 2263; 
(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the presence 
of counsel, unless the prisoner has competently and 
knowingly waived such counsel, and after having been 
advised of the consequences, a State prisoner under capital 
sentence waives the right to pursue habeas corpus review 
under section 2254; or 
(3) a State prisoner files a habeas corpus petition under 
section 2254 within the time required by section 2263 and 
fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal 
right or is denied relief in the district court or any 
subsequent stage of review 
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inmates from utilizing more than one successive habeas corpus challenge 
to the validity or duration of their death sentences.74  Congress’ specific 
intent for the AEDPA was to thwart eleventh hour appeals for stay of 
execution by inmates on the eve of their executions.75 
C. Section 1983 and its Capital Punishment Applicability 
Only recently has Section 1983 jurisprudence crossed paths with 
habeas corpus jurisprudence.76  This section explores how the legitimate 
penological interests requirement in death penalty cases generally has 
manifested in Section 1983 civil rights cases.  That exploration in turn 
brings into focus the facts and laws surrounding present-day death row 
conditions of confinement cases which confront the courts. 
Although Section 1983 provides no affirmative substantive rights, a 
qualified Section 1983 claimant can use this cause of action to enforce 
various substantive rights guarantees that were allegedly deprived 
under “color” of law.77  Shortly after its enactment following the Civil 
                                                                                                             
(c) If one of the conditions in subsection (b) has occurred, no Federal 
court thereafter shall have the authority to enter a stay of execution in 
the case, unless the court of appeals approves the filing of a second or 
successive application under section 2244(b). 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2262(b)-(c) (2000).  
Habeas limitations found in the AEDPA operate similarly to claim preclusion: if the judicial 
review requested goes to the merits of something previously not discussed on its merits, 
there is no second and subsequent habeas petition problem which would invoke the Act, in 
which case an inmate may proceed on alternative Section 1983 claims as well.  Id.  See 
generally Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.  2000). 
74 28 U.S.C. § 2262(b); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51 (2004) 
(describing how an implicit or hybrid habeas claim requires an inmate to exhaust state or 
federal channels before being permitted to bring a federal court habeas action, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). 
75 Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649 (2004).  A common law rule, not specifically 
from the AEDPA, states that “[e]quity must take into consideration the State’s strong 
interest in proceeding with its judgment and . . . attempt[s] at manipulation.”  Id.  There is a 
strong equitable presumption against a stay of execution where the inmate appears to have 
needlessly delayed bringing his Section 1983 claim.  Id. at 650. 
76 Muhammad v. Close was the first case to apply Section 1983 and habeas corpus jointly 
while also maintaining their distinctiveness.  540 U.S. 749 (2004).  See infra notes 99-102 and 
accompanying text. 
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  A prima facie case for civil rights violations under Section 
1983 requires: (1) a natural person as petitioner; (2) a deprivation of federal constitutional 
or statutory rights; and (3) that said deprivation was caused by a defendant acting “[u]nder 
[c]olor of [s]tate [l]aw.”  ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON & IVAN E. BODENSTEINER, CIVIL RIGHTS 
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION, II-43 (2006); see also Crawford v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) 
(rejecting a heightened pleading requirement of culpability or intent in Section 1983 
actions, saying that such a requirement depends on the underlying substantive right being 
alleged).  For an in-depth treatment of Section 1983’s Eighth Amendment precedent, see 
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War, Section 1983 was relegated to virtual disuse for almost a century, 
having been successfully alleged prior to Monroe v. Pape in 1961 on only 
twenty-one occasions in all the nation’s courts combined.78  In contrast, 
Section 1983 litigation is presently common fare for allegations of abuse 
of federal law by the federal government, municipalities, and public 
officials—a turnaround owing largely to increased vindication of Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights on 
which Section 1983’s legislative history is based.79 
1. Practices Leading to Death Row Inmates’ Section 1983 Eighth 
Amendment Claims 
In the rights-restrictive context of prisons and execution chambers, 
Eighth Amendment Section 1983 cases have, for the most part, 
recognized the same penological objectives criteria as the Supreme Court 
set forth in the First Amendment conditions of confinement case Pell v. 
Procunier.80  Pell stated that inmates retain whatever rights are not 
inconsistent with their status as prisoners or with legitimate penological 
objectives.81  Accordingly, there are just three legitimate penological 
                                                                                                             
generally IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, § 1.13 (1987). 
78 365 U.S. 167 (1961); LEVINSON & BODENSTEINER, supra note 77, at II-43; Comment, The 
Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). 
79 LEVINSON & BODENSTEINER, supra note 77, at II-43. Section 1983 is part of the 
“Reconstruction [Legislation],” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-86, though it originated in the Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871.  Id.  Given its origin in Fourteenth Amendment rights and the explicit 
legislative intent to attack civil rights violations under color of law, it has long been clear 
that Section 1983 is a valid abrogation of states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, 
if only for provisions enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  E.g., 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
80 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
81 Id.  For example, a prisoner always retains the First Amendment right to communicate 
about conditions of confinement (or any other matter), absent a narrowly tailored 
compelling concern for content-neutral regulation, and even then a convict must have 
adequate alternative means of communicating with a reasonable audience of his or her 
choice.  Id. at 825-26.  Aside from the fact that the government may not practice 
discrimination against the public based on viewpoint, if it makes public access available 
into a correctional environment, admittance is within the professional discretion of the 
Department of Corrections, which may invite specific members of the public only if doing 
so would be in the best interests of prisoner rehabilitation (that is, the prisoner’s best 
interests and correctional system’s best interests).  Id. at 823, 825.  This demonstrates that, in 
most ways, correctional facilities are necessarily more rights-restrictive than courtrooms, 
for both the public and convicts themselves.  E.g., id. at 826 (permitting reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions limiting access and communication insofar as necessary to 
further significant government interests).  In Pell, California’s Department of Corrections 
Manual Section 415.071 denied the press interviews with individual inmates.  Id. at 820.  
The rule came in reaction to major disciplinary problems which resulted when various 
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objectives recognized in conditions of confinement sufficient to warrant 
legislative deference: the deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, 
and internal security within correctional facilities.82 
Even so, to effectuate the penological goals of capital punishment, 
most states authorize executions by only succinct statutes and grant their 
Departments of Correction broad discretion to handle the bulk of 
implementation.83  The typical state death penalty statute provides the 
                                                                                                             
inmates started gaining media attention.  Id. at 821.  Thus, the Court accepted that those 
deemed best able to aid in prisoner rehabilitation included clergy, family, or legal counsel, 
but not, for instance, criminal co-conspirators.  Id. at 827.  Likewise, the Court in Houchins v. 
KQED announced that the right to gather news within jails by way of audio tape or video 
recordings can be denied because it would constitute “an implied special right of access to 
government-controlled sources of information.”  438 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978) (explaining that the 
“government-controlled sources of information” referred to are not prisoners, but rather 
the prison facilities).  Said the Court: 
The media are not a substitute for or an adjunct of government and, 
like the courts, they are “ill-equipped” to deal with problems of prison 
administration. . . .  The public importance of conditions in penal 
facilities and the media’s role of providing information afford no basis 
for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to 
enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and 
still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes. 
Id. at 9.  But see Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597-98 (1980) (describing a 
presumption of openness for the public and press at trials). 
82 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (analyzing only these three interests as the 
possible “legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system”).  See Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (indicating that in an Eighth Amendment case, “the 
goals” of “the penal function,” as distinct from other functions of the criminal system, are: 
retribution (“to punish justly”), deterrence (“to deter future crime”), and rehabilitation (“to 
return imprisoned persons to society with an improved change of being useful, law-
abiding citizens”)).  Safety or security has, under First Amendment precedent in Section 
1983, been considered a legitimate penological objective, insofar as it places conditions on 
inmates’ confinement which advance the goal of internal safety within prison facilities.  
Pell, 417 U.S. at 823. A recent Eighth Amendment derivative of the interest in prison 
institutional safety is execution chamber security, for the benefit of the execution team.  See 
Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing certain protocols in 
the execution chamber in furtherance of a legitimate penological interest in security and 
safety).  Security is paramount in the execution chamber, since a violent criminal might 
recklessly pursue whatever remaining opportunities for self-preservation are left before he 
is scheduled to die.  Id.  Another, broader correlation is deterrence as protection for society 
and crime prevention in the aggregate.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304-05 (1972) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing societal safety). 
83 E.g., IND. CODE. 35-38-6-1 (2006) “Execution of death sentence; specified time and date; 
executioner”: 
(a) The punishment of death shall be inflicted by intravenous injection 
of a lethal substance or substances into the convicted person: 
(1) in a quantity sufficient to cause the death of the convicted 
person; and 
(2) until the convicted person is dead. 
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common name of the preferred procedure to be used, lethal injection or 
electrocution for instance, followed by an alternate method that can be 
chosen at the prisoner’s timely election or if the preferred method is held 
unconstitutional.84  Next, most death penalty statutes offer basic 
guidelines as to what type of lethal injection chemicals (or electric 
current) should be used to execute a person.85  Finally, these statutes 
generally give state prison officials the direction to “kill them until 
they’re dead” so to speak.86  Beyond these basic guidelines, legislatures 
                                                                                                             
(b) The death penalty shall be inflicted before the hour of sunrise on a 
date fixed by the sentencing court. However, the execution must not 
occur until at least one hundred (100) days after the conviction. 
(c) The superintendent of the state prison, or persons designated by the 
superintendent, shall designate the person who is to serve as the 
executioner. 
(d) The department of correction may adopt rules under IC 4-22-2 necessary 
to implement subsection (a). 
Id. (emphasis added).  See Ewart, supra note 36, at 1168-82 (offering a detailed state-by-state 
comparison of lethal injection policies and procedures).  States and arms of state, including 
legislatures and correctional agencies, are themselves immune from Section 1983 action, 
because they have neither abrogated Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity nor are 
they “persons” within that word’s usual meaning as required in Section 1983.  Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984).  However, if a government 
official violates federal law, the state action he performed is void and open to a damages 
action against this arm of the state.  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).  Section 1983 
also disallows suit against legislators or agency administrators for actions while in their 
law-making capacities, though suit against administrative officials is otherwise generally 
not barred by absolute or qualified immunity.  In particular, Edelman v. Jordan held that 
when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court 
may award an injunction that governs the official’s future conduct, but not one that awards 
retroactive monetary relief.  415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974).  See infra note 90 (discussing 
liability for random and unauthorized Section 1983 violations). 
84 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (Lexis 2006) (“Punishment of death shall, in all 
cases, be inflicted by intravenous injection . . . . If the execution of the sentence of death as 
provided above is held unconstitutional . . . then punishment of death shall, in all cases, be 
inflicted by hanging by the neck.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(b) (West 2006) (“Persons 
sentenced to death prior to or after the operative date of this subdivision shall have the 
opportunity to elect to have the punishment imposed by lethal gas or lethal injection.”).  See 
supra note 44 (numbering the jurisdictions that currently employ each method of 
execution). 
85 E.g., Murder; Sentence to Death; Administration of Punishment, N.J.S.A. 2C:49-2 
(2006).  The New Jersey execution statute calls for “a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting 
barbiturate in a combination with a chemical paralytic agent in a quantity sufficient to 
cause death.”  Id. 
86 E.g., id.  (requiring that “punishment shall be imposed by continuous, intravenous 
administration until the person is dead”).  But see Gordon, supra note 2, at 363 (describing 
how statutes which authorize lethal injection without clarifying the substances, doses, or 
procedures to be used could be deemed “unconstitutionally vague,” though no court has 
done so).  Another possible debacle awaits states that attempt more than one successive 
attempt at execution.  Because most statutes merely authorize a sufficient and continuous 
electrical current or chemical dosage to render death, if additional execution attempts are 
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have tended not to enact any ancillary statute or authorize any rule or 
regulation to advise or assess specific capital punishment-related 
departmental practices.87 
Departments of Correction keep execution protocols quite 
confidential.88  Most states, by statute, exempt death penalty protocols 
from publication as “rules” or “regulations” in the administrative code, 
making it difficult for death row inmates, scholars, the press, or other 
interested third parties to obtain a detailed description of chosen 
execution procedures.89  Even without access to documentation about 
                                                                                                             
not authorized by statute, they may be cruel and unusual punishments.  Second 
Electrocution Attempt, supra note 25, at 349 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. LAW & PROC. art. 569 
(Dart 1943)). 
87 See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 307 (Tenn. 2005) (citing the fact 
that each jurisdiction’s lethal injection methods are of the same origin and have withstood 
constitutional scrutiny as proof that nothing in them needs to be altered).  But see Workman 
v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 2007) (describing Tennessee’s extraordinary efforts 
in 2007 to review and improve upon lethal injection procedures “[n]otwithstanding the 
decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in 2005 and the decision of this court 
[Abdur’Rahman] in 2006”).  See also Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (ordering the state of California execution procedures to be improved to minimize 
the risk of cruel and unusual punishment).  Morales was one of the first instances where a 
court elaborately chided the state for deficiencies in lethal injection protocols.  Id.  
Particularly, cited problems by District Court Judge Fogel were: 
1.  Inconsistent and unreliable screening of execution team 
members . . . .  2. A lack of meaningful training, supervision, and 
oversight of the execution team . . . .  3. Inconsistent and unreliable 
record-keeping . . . .  4. Improper mixing, preparation, and 
administration of sodium thiopental by the execution team . . . .  5. 
Inadequate lighting, overcrowded conditions, and poorly designed 
facilities in which the execution team must work 
Id. at 979-80 (emphasis omitted). 
88 The controlling Florida statute authorizing lethal injection (Fla. Stat. § 922.105(1) 
(2003)) does not specify its lethal injection procedures.  Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 
2100 (2006).  Rather, the state Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is charged with 
implementation.  Id.; Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).  Despite their 
duties, the Florida DOC had not, at the time of the Hill case, proffered rules for specific 
protocol and had even exempted implementation policies and procedures from Florida’s 
Administrative Procedures Act.  Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100.  See Fla. Stat. § 922.105(7).  
According to the district court in Hill, on remand, however, Florida’s full protocol had 
incidentally come to light and was available for review, though through no help of the 
DOC, due to a full evidentiary hearing that had taken place on the record in Sims v. State a 
few years earlier.  Hill v. McDonough, 2006 WL 2556938 *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006) (citing 
Sims, 754 So. 2d at 657).  See also Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(inmate’s claim not timely due to his ample time to know or have reason to know the facts 
and protocol which gave rise to his specific method-of-execution challenge). 
89 E.g., Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 312.  The Tennessee Supreme Court afforded great 
legislative deference to the discretion of its state’s department of corrections, concluding 
that “promulgation requirements of public notice, public hearing, attorney general 
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lethal injection protocol, many death row inmates have nonetheless 
raised Section 1983 challenges on Eighth Amendment grounds, 
implicating a variety of alleged procedural deficiencies in the 
correctional system as cruel and unusual conditions of confinement.90  
They contend, largely, that corrections officers who act as executioners 
are unintelligibly chosen, personally inexperienced, and otherwise 
poorly trained to avoid inflicting unconstitutional cruel and unusual 
punishment during the lethal injection procedure.91  For instance, in 
Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, an inmate on Tennessee’s death row learned 
that the state’s execution protocol was not standardized, but rather 
existed only in how-to manuals, handwritten and updated by a few 
correctional officials.92 
To be sure, several states have gleaned from one another a practice 
of regularly-scheduled mock-up training for executioners.  Some states 
have or will significantly revamp their procedures in reaction to Section 
1983 challenges, but a lack of official standards for execution behavior 
means that, despite their common origins, not all jurisdictions’ lethal 
injection protocols are created equally.93  Some state protocols have 
                                                                                                             
approval, and filing with the state are simply not realistic requirements for implementing 
procedures that concern the intricacies and complexities of a prison environment.”  Id.  See 
supra note 88; infra notes 194-96, 198, 200-01 (discussing difficulties in obtaining access to 
lethal injection protocols). 
90 E.g., Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 312; Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2096; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 
U.S. 637, 643 (2004); Reid v. Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 2004); Morales, 465 F. 
Supp. 2d 972; Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006); Emmett v. 
Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546-47 (E.D. Va. 2007).  In Section 1983 litigation, a claimant 
may challenge statutes or established state procedures subject to the Matthews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), balancing test, weighing the risk and severity of private 
deprivation against the government interest and lack of alternatives.  Zinermon v. Burch, 
494 U.S. 113 (1990).  Section 1983 litigation also allows challenges to recurring violations 
that are not random and unauthorized, since such practices are the de facto policy and 
custom of prisons, using the Matthews test.  Id. at 115 n.1; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
455 U.S. 422 (1982).  Challenges to random and unauthorized violations by government 
officials, however, must be addressed on procedural due process grounds, not Section 1983 
bases.  Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra note 7.  But see 
Burch, 494 U.S. at 138-39.  See supra note 83 (describing governmental immunity and its 
limits under Section 1983). 
91 E.g., Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2096; Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 292; Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d. 
at 979-80. 
92 181 S.W.3d 292, 312 (Tenn. 2005).  John Gibeaut, It’s All in the Execution: Prosecutors 
Fear Limitless Civil Rights Complaints over Lethal Injection Procedures, A.B.A. J. 17-18 (Aug. 
2006) (noting that, from the defense attorney’s perspective in the Abdur’Rahman case, these 
manuals are merely handwritten and amended by notes and corrections in the margins). 
93 E.g. Howard Witt, Pain of Execution Debated, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 2004, at 8, available at 
2004 WLNR 19892328 (citing David Dow, University of Houston Law School, as saying that 
lethal injection protocols have been largely unchanged and unscrutinized since first used 
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and copied among the states following the model used in Texas in 1982).  See, e.g., Morales 
v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing “walk-through[]” training at 
California’s San Quentin facility).  See Miller, supra note 47, at 231-32 (noting a variety of 
problems which some states possess and others may not); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979-
80; supra note 92 (discussing adjudged problems with California’s protocol).  The 
evidentiary basis for states’ confidence in their lethal injection protocols can be very slight.  
See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005). 
There was no evidence in the record that the procedures followed 
under the lethal injection protocol have resulted in the problems feared 
by the petitioner; indeed the undisputed evidence was that the sole 
lethal injection carried out in Tennessee, i.e., Robert Coe in 2000, had 
revealed “no significant difficulties with the process.” 
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 310-11.  But see Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 899 
(6th Cir. 2007); supra note 82 (explaining in detail the lethal injection improvements in 
Tennessee); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80 (ordering various death penalty 
improvements); Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(ordering the state to make one of two improvements in a timely manner to avoid a stay of 
execution: (1) specify that “only sodium thiopental or another barbiturate or combination 
of barbiturates” will be used in execution; or (2) agree to independently guarantee, by the 
direct observation of qualified personnel, that the inmate is indeed unconscious before the 
second and third chemicals are injected and this “in a manner comparable to that normally 
used in medical settings where a combination of sedative and paralytic medications is 
administered”). 
 In California, as most other states, a qualified person must be formally trained and 
experienced in general anesthesia, though that may include correctional employees.  Id. at 
1048.  The identity of that person may be kept confidential in documentation and by the 
clothes they wear during execution.  Id.  Like California, a North Carolina court has held 
that an execution requires not only trained personnel to proceed but that  they must also be 
“present and accessible to Plaintiff throughout the execution” to guarantee that the inmate 
is “in all respects unconscious prior to and at the time of the administration of any 
pancuronium bromide or potassium chloride.”  Brown v. Beck, 2006 WL 3914717 *8 
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006).  Their role is to immediately return the inmate to unconsciousness 
if he ever “exhibit[s] effects of consciousness.”  Id. 
 Other states place security above prisoner safety in the chamber.  Because prisoners 
can be expected to attempt to escape execution by whatever means necessary in the last 
moments of their lives, these states purposefully “deviate from the surgical norm of 
physical proximity” and allow execution personnel to be farther away from the condemned 
and the lethal chemical syringes for their own safety.  Workman, 486 F.3d at 909-10.  This is 
the situation particularly in states which view execution procedures as requiring a lower 
standard of care than generally expected of medical practice.  See Emmett, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 
543.  To compensate for the executioners’ conceded inability to monitor Pentothal intake, 
Tennessee protocol, at least, now calls for there to be a television monitor in the execution 
chamber and a camera above the gurney where the inmate lies, for the executioner’s remote 
viewing.  As an added measure, in Tennessee, the warden remains in the chamber and 
stands within a foot of the top of the gurney, having been trained to detect problems like 
crimped IV lines or failure of the injection to go into the inmate’s vein.  Id.  In Missouri, by 
contrast, non-proximity is a greater threat, as the execution team’s work from an adjacent 
room has always been partially obstructed by blinds, the inmate faces away from window, 
and the inmate’s entire body except for his face has been completely covered by a sheet.  
Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1072. 
 Linked to proximity, a range of other problems have been noted as well, including 
overcrowding in the chamber adjacent to the execution room and potential problems with 
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failed to specify what dosages are necessary to ensure proper lethal 
injection while others lack clear guidance for prison officials in the event 
of a botched execution.94 
The most common death row inmates’ Section 1983 contests at 
present regard the use of a muscle relaxing, paralytic drug called 
pancuronium bromide, or Pavulon, in the lethal injection protocol.95  
Pavulon is the second in a three-drug sequence called for by the 
protocols of thirty-five states and the federal government.96  Potentially, 
if inexperienced officials don’t inject a sufficient amount of the first drug, 
a form of sodium, to render the prisoner unconscious or otherwise inject 
Pavulon at the wrong time interval thereafter, a death row inmate could 
be forced to endure the third, killing drug—a potassium chloride 
                                                                                                             
positioning and testing IV bags.  Henry Weinstein & Maura Dolan, State Defends Execution 
Procedure, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, at 3, available at 2006 WLNR 19528769. 
94 See Miller, supra note 47 (commenting on the three main causes of botched lethal 
injections); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d 792, 979-80; Brown, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8; Taylor v. 
Crawford, No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006), rev’d 487 
F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007). 
95 A first drug, sodium thiopental or sodium pentothal, is a barbiturate for anesthetics.  
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 86.  Given at 2000 mg, (twice what patients receive 
during long medical operations) it quickly makes a patient unconscious.  Id.  Pancuronium 
bromide (“Pavulon”) is a muscle relaxant common to heart surgeries, but when given at 10 
times the normal dose (100 mg), as in lethal injections, it causes paralysis and respiratory 
failure.  Id.  Nevertheless, because Pavulon, if used alone, would take around ten minutes 
to kill a person, lethal injection protocols utilize potassium chloride (used in bypass surgery 
to relax the heart and stop its pumping) to accomplish that result in about ten seconds.  Id. 
The court in Workman cited state analyses of one and two-drug execution protocols which 
would each eliminate the use of Pavulon, but for various reasons, Tennessee refused to 
adopt either.  Workman, 486 F.3d at 902-03.  Disadvantages feared in the two-drug protocol 
included the likelihood of “involuntary movement which might be misinterpreted as a 
seizure or an indication of consciousness” and the fact that no other jurisdiction had 
experience with such a protocol from which to borrow confidence.  Id. at 902-03, 919.  A 
one-chemical protocol, much like the simple and less risky procedure used to euthanize 
animals, would simply be a massive dosage to induce cardiac arrest.  Id.  The 
disadvantages of such an approach would be unpredictability, the fact that it has not been 
tested on humans by any state, and that it is slow and might therefore result in 
unconstitutionally prolonged or lingering death.  Id.  Even so, there are at least three 
disadvantages to the three-drug protocol as well: that Pavulon requires refrigeration; that 
there is a chance of error in implementation; and that obtaining, storing, and safeguarding 
lethal injection chemicals can be complicated.  Workman, 486 F.3d at 918 Appx. A. 
96 Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind 
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 
at 146 tbl. 11 (2002). 
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injection which causes muscle cramping and cardiac arrest—while 
simultaneously conscious and paralyzed.97 
Although courts will eventually be obliged to decide whether being 
put to death while conscious and paralyzed is itself cruel and unusual, 
thus far, most are occupied by the initial question of whether 
inexperienced technicians and inconclusive execution protocols create a 
grave risk of cruel and unusual harm.98  What Eighth Amendment case 
                                                 
97 Leonidas G. Koniaris, Teresa A. Zimmers, David A. Lubarsky, & Jonathan P. Sheldon, 
Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 THE LANCET 1412 (Apr. 16-22, 
2005).  The Lancet article has been the primary impetus for current Section 1983 claims.  
John Gibeaut, A Painful Way to Die?, A.B.A. J. 20-21 (Apr. 2006).  According to Dr. Mark J. S. 
Heath, an expert on lethal injection commonly sought out by inmates, Pavulon paralyzes 
not only a person’s body but his lungs as well, which means that prisoners may suffocate 
while the last drug causes muscle cramping and a fatal heart attack.  E.g., Abdur’Rahman, 
181 S.W.3d at 300-03.  Dr. Heath testified that the drug creates a “chemical veil,” preventing 
witnesses and officials from noticing an inmate’s suffering.  Id. at 302.  The plaintiff in Hill 
particularly alleged the first drug was insufficient to make a person unconscious for 
suffocation and death.  Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100.  This much was confirmed by Carol Weiher, 
founder and president of Anesthesia Awareness Campaign, who in 1998 was anaesthetized 
using Pavulon during a medical procedure but woke up in a state of paralysis, cognizant of 
what was going on but unable to speak or move.  Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 303. But see 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (explaining that the opinions of experts do not 
determine constitutional requirements but are subservient to the better determinant of 
contemporary standards of decency: the public attitude); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 
350 (1981). 
[S]uch opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect to some 
questions, but “they simply do not establish the constitutional minima; 
rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in 
question.” . . .  Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as 
heavily in determining contemporary standards of decency as “the 
public attitude toward a given sanction.” 
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 350; see also infra notes 111-12, 173, 175, 197 and accompanying text 
(regarding the public attitude or public interest as a factor in the propriety of injunctive 
relief). 
98 E.g., Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2104 (2006) (remanding for a determination 
on the merits regarding Florida’s lethal injection protocol); Hill v. McDonough, 2006 WL 
2556938 *2-4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2006) (deciding, without reaching the merits, that Hill’s 
claim was untimely).  The states that have had occasion to determine the constitutionality 
of Pavulon have returned mixed results.  See Workman, 486 F.3d at 905-09 (stating that the 
methods used currently do not cause cruel and unusual harm because: (1) the Supreme 
Court has never invalidated any method of execution; (2) lower state and federal courts 
have held the same; (3) contemporary standards of decency support this conclusion; and 
(4) there is no wantonness or deliberate indifference in a procedure aimed at pain-
avoidance); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1085 (8th Cir. 2007); Emmett v. Johnson, 489 
F. Supp. 2d 543, 543 (E.D. Va. 2007); Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 308-09 (finding no risk of 
unnecessary physical and psychological suffering and thus no cruel and unusual 
punishment in Tennessee’s lethal injection protocol even under its former version).  Contra 
Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80; Brown, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (each conditionally 
barring lethal injection as unconstitutional unless and until specific changes are made).  
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law has developed on these conditions of confinement cases, at the 
Supreme Court level, is presented next. 
2. Supreme Court Interpretation in Recent Death Row Inmates’ Section 
1983 Actions 
For cruel and unusual punishment claims, the Supreme Court first 
delineated when conditions of confinement actions could be brought 
alone, without traditional habeas pleading, in the 2004 non-death 
penalty case of Muhammad v. Close.99  Muhammad offered a reliable 
distinction between core habeas corpus actions, “hybrid[]” habeas plus 
Section 1983 actions, and purely Section 1983 conditions of confinement 
actions upon which future civil rights actions might proceed.100  Citing a 
                                                                                                             
 The opponents of the three-drug procedure do so oppose it for various reasons.  Some 
have deemed the use of Pavulon torturous, hence cruel and unusual by definition.  Witt, 
supra note 93, at 8.  Indeed, Texas, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Ohio courts have all heard arguments that Pavulon, “which does nothing to prevent the 
experience of pain, renders condemned inmates unable to speak, twitch or cry out in 
response to it.”  Id.  It is undisputed that the inherent properties of the second and third 
chemicals, respectively, are to mask any visible signs of pain and cause extreme pain where 
there is improper anaesthetization.  Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1082.  Using the same rationale, it 
would seem that if the problem is insufficient anesthesia to make a person unconscious, the 
case concerns a risk of lingering death, also cruel and unusual punishment.  Id.  The agony 
of capital punishment is said to derive from not only the prospect of pain but also the 
expectation of death, exemplified in the long process of waiting (or mock executions) which 
are commonly used worldwide as psychological torture.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 
18, at 87.  Other potential problems, especially in the absence of medical personnel, include 
injection into muscle instead of vein, a problem which once caused an inmate named James 
Autry to die slowly, consciously, moving around, and complaining of pain.  Id. at 86.  In a 
successful lethal injection procedure, on the other hand, “[t]he only physical pain, if the 
killing is done correctly, ‘is the pain of the initial prick of the needle.’”  Id.  The execution of 
Lawrence Lee Buxton in 1991, for example, was one that proceeded as planned, in that all 
that witnesses heard was a deep breath by the prisoner, then a gurgling noise as his tongue 
dropped back in his mouth.  Id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
99 540 U.S. 749 (2004). 
100 Id. at 750-51.  Core habeas challenges are those regarding the validity of one’s 
conviction or sentence or the duration of one’s stay in prison.  Id. at 750 (citing Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)).  Hybrid actions are where a prisoner seeks a damages 
remedy, which habeas does not provide, whereas the claim itself challenges the validity or 
duration of the sentence.  Id. at 750 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).  The 
rule in Heck says that a claim brought under Section 1983 will be treated instead as a habeas 
action, subject to AEDPA rigors, where the issues are core issues of duration or validity.  Id.  
According to the Muhammad Court, Edwards v. Balisok featured one such validity action in 
disguise, where an inmate attempted at damages and equitable relief for procedural defects 
in a prison’s administrative processes.  Id. at 751 (citing Edwards, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)).  For 
true Section 1983 claims, which only challenge conditions of confinement, the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000), operates instead of the Heck rule and the 
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hybrid claim rule from Heck v. Humphrey, Muhammad stated that any 
inmate’s death penalty challenge which necessarily implies the factual or 
legal invalidity of his death sentence is actually a successive habeas 
petition in Section 1983 clothing.101  Courts, by looking through form to 
substance, should treat a hybrid claim the same as a core habeas 
complaint rather than a conditions of confinement claim as pled.102 
Nelson v. Campbell, following closely on the heels of Muhammad, was 
the first Supreme Court case to prohibit a specific execution procedure as 
an unlawful condition of confinement on Eighth Amendment grounds.103  
Without solidifying the Eighth Amendment fate of “method-of-execution 
claims generally,” that Court explained that a cut-down procedure to 
gain venous access for lethal injection was at best a gratuitous element of 
the procedure, unnecessary to Alabama’s death penalty punishment.104  
                                                                                                             
AEDPA, merely requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies prior to court action.  
Id. 
101 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51 (2004). 
102 See supra note 100; infra note 108. 
103 541 U.S. 637 (2004).  David Nelson was permitted in a Section 1983 action to challenge 
Alabama’s use of the “cut-down” procedure to access the veins of prisoners executed by 
lethal injection as cruel and unusual punishment, since an alternative procedure, the 
“central line” procedure was not unlawful in the state’s lethal injection statute and was 
personally acceptable to him.  Id. at 646; see infra note 104.  Assuming Nelson is applicable to 
any conduct surrounding executions that can be described as a condition of confinement, it 
might invalidate, in whole or in part, Florida’s secondary execution method, the electric 
chair.  Id. at 647, 650.  Florida’s electric chair has malfunctioned on several occasions, 
causing unnecessary pain to its victims.  Kearns, supra note 5, at 207.  Because the state is 
not bound by statute to use that particular chair or electrocution whatsoever, the option to 
demand the state to use a substitute electric chair is viable (barring cost as a compelling 
countervailing government interest), and standards of decency would seem to support the 
same decision.  Nevertheless, when the Florida Supreme Court took up this exact scenario 
in Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997), it ignored evolving standards of decency and 
instead determined the use of a frequently malfunctioning chair was not a wanton or 
deliberately indifferent rendition of unnecessary pain upon the state’s prisoners.  Id. at 77. 
104 Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645-46 (emphasis omitted).  While declining the defendant’s 
argument that a ruling favorable to the death row plaintiff would flood the courts as a 
result, the Supreme Court refused to resolve “how to treat method-of-execution claims 
generally.”  Id. at 644, 649.  Hill did the same in effect.  Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 
2102 (2006) (avoiding the issue of method-of-execution analysis generally because Nelson is 
controlling precedent).  Regarding the non-necessity of the cut-down procedure, the Court 
in Nelson said: 
That venous access is a necessary prerequisite does not imply that a 
particular means of gaining such access is likewise necessary.  Indeed, 
the gravamen of petitioner’s entire claim is that the use of the cut-
down would be gratuitous.  Merely labeling something as part of an 
execution procedure is insufficient to insulate it from § 1983 attack.  If 
as a legal matter the cut-down were a statutorily mandated part of the 
lethal injection protocol, or if as a factual matter petitioner were unable 
or unwilling to concede acceptable alternatives for gaining venous 
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In the wake of Nelson, Section 1983 represents the only cause of action in 
United States history, aside from a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
recognized to bring death penalty claims under the Eighth 
Amendment.105 
In June 2006, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and built on Nelson in 
Hill v. McDonough.106  Hill allowed a convict to challenge in advance the 
foreseeable risk that execution conditions or protocols using Pavulon or 
like paralytic agents would cause gratuitous and unnecessary pain.107  
The primary limitation on death penalty conditions cases, in the order 
                                                                                                             
access, respondents might have a stronger argument that success on 
the merits, coupled with injunctive relief, would call into question the 
death sentence itself. . . .  No Alabama statute requires use of the cut-
down, . . . respondents have offered no duly-promulgated regulations 
to the contrary . . . [and] the State now seems willing to implement 
petitioner’s proposed alternatives. 
Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645-46.  But see Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(acknowledging that Tennessee permits the cut-down procedure where a usable vein 
cannot be found). 
105 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879); Muhammad, 540 U.S. 749.  See also 
Kearns, supra note 5, at 198-99 (commenting particularly on the inordinate span of time 
between cases actually approaching method-of-execution analysis, namely Wilkerson in 
1879 and Roper in 2005). 
106 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).  In Nelson, the Court explained that its recognition of a valid 
Section 1983 action was narrow and did not specifically permit method-of-execution claims 
generally under Section 1983.  Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649.  In Hill, no limitation was stated on 
the availability of Section 1983 to challenge conditions of confinement (as opposed to the 
death sentence or duration of confinement), and only cursory heed was given to the 
difference from the Nelson case factually, namely: challenging the chemical injection 
sequence (Hill) versus challenging the surgical procedures prior to lethal injection (Nelson).  
Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102.  In a strange move, perhaps because Nelson was controlling, the Hill 
Court also ignored the method-of-execution reasoning it used in Roper just one year before, 
deferring instead to the Eleventh Circuit’s contemporary standards of decency 
consideration from below while leaving Roper’s evolving standards approach 
unchallenged.  Id. at 2104. 
107 Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102.  Of the thirty-seven states which employ lethal injection as their 
primary statutory means of execution, all but one uses the same three-drug sequence of 
injected chemicals.  See Denno, supra note 96, at 146 tbl. 11 (New Jersey uses a substitute for 
Pavulon).  Because the Florida state legislature did not draw up particular lethal injection 
protocol in statute nor require its Department of Corrections to do so and because Clarence 
Hill was denied access to any such information, he had to base his claim upon the 
likelihood that the state would use the same procedures that were described in a case from 
five years prior, Sims v. State. 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100.  In Sims, the 
state had actually permitted access to the detailed protocol in advance.  Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 
2100.  See supra notes 88-89.  In sum, because petitioner Hill did not challenge the sentence 
itself, his case did not sound in habeas under Nelson but in enjoining the state “from 
executing [Hill] in the manner they currently intend” where the anticipated protocol was 
alleged to cause “‘a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and unnecessary’ pain.” Hill, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2102. 
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addressed by Hill, is the hybrid rule from Heck.108  A second barrier, 
provided the claim is truly a “conditions” case, is the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”).109  The PLRA bars frivolous and malicious claims, 
claims for which no relief can be granted, claims which precede 
exhaustion of available state administrative channels, or claims where 
damages are sought from an immune public official.110  Lastly, if the 
                                                 
108 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  Hill returned to the essential question of 
whether relief sought by an inmate would challenge the “fact” or “validity” of a sentence in 
purpose or effect.  Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644.  The Court in Nelson said, “imposition of the 
death penalty presupposes a means of carrying it out.”  Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644.  Under the 
Heck rule, habeas actions challenge the fact of confinement or its duration, and are bound 
by the AEDPA.  Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2101.  Whether seeking injunctive or monetary relief, on 
the other hand, “an inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement . . . may be 
brought under § 1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).  See also Nelson, 541 
U.S. at 647, supra note 59.  Absent a finding that inmate Hill challenged procedure which 
was necessary to the lethal injection, the Court concluded, as it had in Nelson, that 
injunctive relief would not prevent the State from implementing the sentence.  Hill, 126 S. 
Ct. at 2101.  Consequently, the suit as presented would not be deemed a challenge to the 
fact of “the sentence itself.”  Id.  The same was much less nobly ensured under habeas.  In 
Dawson v. Georgia, the Georgia Supreme Court had waited for the state legislature to 
provide lethal injection as the preferred death penalty alternative, with electrocution at a 
prisoner’s election.  554 S.E.2d 137 (Ga. 2001).  Only six months later did that court allow 
the first prisoner challenge to electrocution itself as cruel and unusual as that state 
employed it, something that had never been allowed when electrocution was the only 
statutory option, regardless of how cruel and unusual the procedure might have been.  
Kearns, supra note 5, at 211. 
109 Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004); see supra note 100.  The PLRA states, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies 
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 
(b) Failure of State to adopt or adhere to administrative grievance 
procedure 
The failure of a State to adopt or adhere to an administrative grievance 
procedure shall not constitute the basis for an action under section 
1997a or 1997c of this title. 
(c) Dismissal 
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a 
party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 
other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the 
action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant who is immune from such relief. 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)-(c)(1) (2000). 
110 Id.  As a basic rule, Section 1983 does not require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies.  
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).  This continues to be true for all state judicial avenues.  
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action survives PLRA rigors, Hill instructed the trial court, on remand, to 
determine the inmate’s likelihood of success on the merits.111  At that 
stage, inmates must prove a substantial risk that gratuitous pain will be 
inflicted.112  When each of these limitations has been surpassed, an 
                                                                                                             
Id.  However, in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, the Supreme Court permitted the 
exhaustion of state administrative channels requirement which Congress delineated in 
creating the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (predecessor to 
the PLRA of 1995).  457 U.S. 496 (1982).  This law created a specific exhaustion requirement 
for adult prisoners using Section 1983 and was validated because of a specific 
Congressional departure from the usual non-exhaustion rule, as opposed to relying on a 
judicially-imposed exhaustion requirement.  Id.  Exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
pursuant to PLRA, is required for all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or 
occurrences, regardless of whether they involve general circumstances of incarceration or 
particular episodes, and whether they allege Eighth Amendment violations based on use of 
excessive force or some other wrong.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, § 7(a); Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002). 
111 Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2103 (2006).  The case has since been decided on 
remand, and Hill has been executed.  Hill v. McDonough, 127 S. Ct. 34 (Sept. 20, 2006) 
(denying stay of execution); Brief Wire, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, available at 2006 
WLNR 16361036 (stating that Hill had been put to death).  Likelihood of success on the 
merits is included among the following four factors balanced when most courts determine 
whether to award preliminary injunctive relief: “(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to 
the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied, (2) the likelihood of harm to the 
defendant if the requested relief is granted, (3) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed 
on the merits, and (4) the public interest.”  Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 548 
(E.D. Va. 2007).  See, e.g., Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2007); Brown v. 
Beck, 2006 WL 3914717, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006).  In California, injunctive relief is also 
possible if an inmate can demonstrate “either a combination of probable success on the 
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised by the 
balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.”  Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 792, 1040 
(N.D. Cal. 2006).  Under the latter test, “the greater the relative hardship to the party 
seeking the preliminary injunction, the less probability of success must be established by 
the party.”  Id.  For instance, the Fourth Circuit holds that the absence of meaningful 
retrospective remedies (for executed inmates) lessens the inmate’s showing required for 
preliminary injunctions in cases involving Section 1983 violations.  Brown, 2006 WL 
3914717, at *6 (citing Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 362 (4th Cir. 
1991) (balancing the likelihood of irreparable harms to each party)).  See Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571, 593, 597-98; supra notes 34, 64; infra note 172 and 
accompanying text (concerning the public’s interest in execution). 
112 Likelihood of success on the merits has thus far been difficult to prove in courts which 
don’t accept that Pavulon use substantially risks gratuitous pain.  The Supreme Courts of 
Tennessee and Connecticut refused to believe Pavulon creates such a risk, relying, prior to 
Hill, on an old test for methods and procedures of execution challenges from Weems v. 
United States.  217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 
(Tenn. 2005); State v. Webb, 750 A.2d 448 (Conn. 2000).  That analysis considered: (1) if a 
method falls within contemporary standards of decency; (2) if a method offends the dignity 
of a prisoner and society; (3) if a method causes unnecessary physical pain; and (4) if a 
method causes unnecessary psychological suffering.  Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 206.  
This Weems analysis would appear to be obsolete now that Hill has set forth new standards 
for injunctive relief in conditions cases.  See, e.g., Workman, 486 F.3d at 905-09 (finding no 
likelihood of success on the merits having made four different observations on cruel and 
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inmate has apparently succeeded in proving cruel and unusual 
punishment under Hill. 
In summary, death row inmates can now challenge not only the very 
validity or prolongation of their death sentences for inflicting cruel and 
unusual punishment in habeas cases, but also the means by which or 
circumstances under which they face their death penalties.  These 
circumstances may include what procedure is used to access their veins 
and what preliminary chemicals are injected into them.113  To address 
these new claims, the Supreme Court has not attempted to adapt its 
traditionally relied upon method-of-execution analysis.  Instead, the 
Court set forth a framework in Nelson and Hill specifically for conditions 
of confinement Section 1983 claims, without expressly attempting to 
reconcile the two approaches.114 
III.  ANALYSIS 
While the Hill decision has mobilized death row inmates nationwide 
to test the conditions of confinement avenue for relief, both Nelson and 
Hill underscored the need to reconcile the approach to this fledgling 
Section 1983 line of cases with its longstanding predecessor, the method-
of-execution jurisprudence.115  The Court’s conceded failure to reconcile 
modern conditions cases with “method–of-execution claims generally” 
implies that Hill’s current test for preliminary injunctive relief, while 
workable thus far, is simply a temporary fix.116  Taking this cue, the 
analysis that follows offers a firm resolution adopting the prevailing 
                                                                                                             
unusual punishment); Emmett, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 552-54 (no likelihood of success on the 
merits); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 2007).  But see Morales, 415 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1047 (preliminary injunction conditionally denied); Brown, 2006 WL 3914717, at 
*8 (preliminary injunction conditionally denied). 
113 Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645-46 (denying use of the “cut-down” procedure for gaining 
venous access); Hill, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (remanding for determination of the constitutionality of 
Pavulon, the second in a three drug lethal injection sequence); see supra notes 104, 107 and 
accompanying text.  Media reports that describe these Section 1983 actions as attacks on the 
death penalty itself are mistaken.  Workman, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.  These cases are about 
neither death penalty’s morality nor methods of execution employed, but about particular 
procedures implemented.  Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 973. 
114 See supra Part II.B (method-of-execution analysis).  See supra text accompanying notes 
109-13 (Hill test for cruel and unusual punishment conditions of confinement allegations). 
115 See supra notes 104, 106 ( (highlighting where the Court in each instance deferred on 
the issue of method-of-execution determinations). 
116 Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645.  See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (Hill test for cruel 
and unusual punishment conditions of confinement allegations).  Nelson/Hill analysis has 
been succeeded by several lower court cases  E.g., Workman, 486 F.3d at 905-09; Emmett, 489 
F. Supp. 2d at 552-54; Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1084-85; Morales, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Brown, 
2006 WL 3914717, at *8. 
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approach for its new jurisprudential counterpart.  The proposed 
reconciliation, as the remainder of this Note argues, promotes the policy 
goals and the public interest common to each cause of action better than 
has been done previously.117  Part III.A offers a means to reconcile habeas 
and Section 1983 determinations.  Part III.B then discusses what 
government interests fit within the category “penological,” as is required 
whenever consciously or in effect depriving prisoners’ constitutional 
rights.118  Finally, Part III.C examines which penological interests are 
legitimate goals within lethal injection procedures as currently 
applied.119 
A. Reconciling Method-of-Execution Analysis and Section 1983 Claims 
Historically, habeas and Section 1983 death penalty claims may 
appear to share scant common grounds for consolidation into a singular 
method-of-execution analysis.120  Yet, despite disagreement within 
method-of-execution precedent over the objective and subjective 
determinants of “evolving” versus “contemporary” standards of 
decency, habeas and Section 1983 jurisprudence each can turn on 
legitimate penological objectives in Eighth Amendment adjudication.121  
In each context, both Section 1983 and habeas profess to place a 
prisoner’s constitutional rights higher than either non-penological or 
illegitimate penological interests.122  Any distinction between the two lies 
                                                 
117 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (method-of-execution analysis); see supra 
notes 109-13 and accompanying text (Hill test for cruel and unusual punishment conditions 
of confinement allegations).  See infra Part IV. 
118 See infra Part III.B. 
119 See infra Part III.C. 
120 Compare supra Part II.B (history of method-of-execution analysis in habeas), with supra 
Part II.C (history of Eighth Amendment and Section 1983 conditions of confinement 
actions). 
121 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing the objective determinant of 
both evolving and contemporary standards of decency concepts—legislative enactments—
and the subjective factors considered only in evolving standards of decency analysis: 
substantial shifts in society and international indicators).  Compare supra Part II.B.3 
(elaborating on legitimate penological objectives in method-of-execution analysis), with 
supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing the same objectives required in 
Section 1983 conditions of confinement actions, in First and Eighth Amendment precedent). 
122 See supra notes 18, 20, 26, 55-56, 81 and accompanying text (each describing in part the 
principle that prisoners retain all their rights unless reasonably or non-excessively taken 
from them in pursuit of legitimate state penological objectives by virtue of their status as 
inmates). 
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only in what objectives are perceived to be penological and legitimate 
objectives.123 
A second conceptual barrier is anticipating what an inmate’s 
method-of-execution challenge to a legitimate penological interest might 
entail, considering that the history of habeas actions, while inundated 
with decency and proportionality concerns, is devoid of the sort of death 
penalty penology determinations which Coker supposed to be possible.124  
Conversely, it appears that every conditions of confinement claim 
challenges precisely penological interests, that is, the reasons why 
prisons employ particular means of treating inmates.125  Just as judicial 
deference is given in habeas cases where the state proffers legitimate 
rationale for capital punishment, there would be no apparent reason, in 
conditions of confinement cases, for judicial deference to be withheld if 
the government were to offer Coker-consistent legitimate penological 
objectives for specifically challenged death row conditions.126 
In defense of their conditions of confinement, governments might 
posit an array of legitimate penological objectives.  Retribution and 
deterrence would seem to top the list, and they are potent at the 
sentencing phase or when considering proportionality of punishment 
concerns, but of them, only deterrence has been cited as a justification for 
                                                 
123 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 350 (1981) (defining the retribution, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation interests in “the penal function”); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 
823 (1974); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir. 2007) (introducing the 
penological interests in institutional and execution chamber safety and their scope).  See 
supra Parts II.B.1-2 (describing historical developments in standards of decency and 
proportionality method-of-execution factors). 
124 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (describing how challenges to legitimate 
penological objectives would look if ever undertaken); see also supra note 56 (illuminating 
how rarely courts have considered a challenge to penologcial objectives through method-
of-execution means). 
125 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 817, 822-23; supra Part II.B.2. 
126 See supra note 60 (describing federalism and legislative competence as reasons for 
deference).  See also Nelson, 541 U.S at 644. 
[A] constitutional challenge seeking to permanently enjoin the use of 
lethal injection may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence 
itself.  A finding of unconstitutionality would require statutory 
amendment or variance, imposing significant costs on the State and the 
administration of its penal system.  And while it makes little sense to 
talk about the ‘duration’ of a death sentence, a State retains a 
significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely 
fashion. 
Id.  The PLRA, similarly, provides for a check on injunctive relief of any sort, requiring that 
extra weight be given should the outcome have “any adverse impact on . . . the operation of 
a criminal justice system.”  Id. at 650 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)-(2) (2000)); see supra notes 
26, 55-56 and accompanying text (describing the Coker test). 
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the treatment of prisoners outside the realm of death row.127  Along with 
deterrence, First Amendment cases have stipulated that rehabilitation 
and internal prison safety are penological justifications for various 
conditions of confinement unrelated to the death penalty.128  Given the 
death penalty context of this Note, rehabilitation will not, however, be 
entertained as a possible penological interest for the same reason that 
deterrence is not aimed at death row inmates themselves: the state has 
not vested an interest in the betterment of condemned persons.129  
Internal prison safety and security, on the other hand, has been 
pinpointed as a penological feature that might contribute to a substantial 
risk of gratuitous pain in the execution chamber.130  Without 
hypothecating other specific, legitimate penological interests called for 
by lethal injection, this analysis will, consistent with Nelson and Hill, sum 
up institutional security and all interests other than retribution and 
deterrence under the heading “administrative necessity.”131 
                                                 
127 See supra Part II.B.3 (traditional application of retribution and deterrence objectives); 
Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-23; supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
128 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974); supra notes 80-82 and accompanying 
text. 
129 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing how, except for believers in 
specific or incapacitation deterrence, the Supreme Court and academia generally do not 
advance the death penalty as a deterrent for death row inmates themselves). 
130 See Pell, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23; supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (describing the 
penological interest in institutional safety); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909-10 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (stating that, for security reasons, no medical personnel are permitted near the 
prisoner during execution in Tennessee); supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing 
varying views in the law and medical community on the ethics and necessity of medically 
trained personnel in the lethal injection process).  Inmates’ claims to injury are strongly 
related to the absence or distance of medically trained personnel in their last moments, a 
presence so integral that, in light of the fact that leading medical organizations frown upon 
participation in executions, a court ordering more physician involvement is considered by 
some to be tantamount to banning executions.  See supra note 93 (citing California Atty. 
Gen. Dane R. Gillette). 
131 See infra Part III.C.2.  Said the Nelson Court: 
[W]e have previously concluded that a § 1983 suit for damages that 
would ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the fact of a inmate’s 
conviction, or ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the length of an 
inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until the 
inmate obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal habeas, 
challenge to his conviction or sentence. . . . Even so, we were careful in 
Heck to stress the importance of the term ‘necessarily.’ 
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646-47 (2004) (limiting the scope of “necessity” to 
indispensable or otherwise hardly challengeable aspects of execution procedures).  Hill v. 
McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (2006) (affirming Nelson despite the argument in the 
State’s amici that no component of any execution procedure could stand against the Nelson 
rule because none may be “strictly necessary”); see supra note 108 (explaining how the term 
“necessarily” applies when the state would in law or fact be unable to carry out its 
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B. Penological Objectives: the Conditions of Confinement Threshold 
Assuming a death row inmate has made the prima facie Section 1983 
showing that certain conditions of confinement create a substantial risk 
of serious harm, the government ought to have a basic burden of 
production to demonstrate those conditions were penological necessities 
rather than gratuitous measures.132  Gratuitous infliction of pain is 
presumably synonymous with excessive, unnecessary, and unusual 
                                                                                                             
execution by any other means).  Given that most states defer to Department of Corrections 
administration of the death penalty and that Nelson and Hill have narrowly defined what 
conditions of confinement are strictly necessary to states in the event of Section 1983 
constitutional challenge, the term administrative necessity seems an appropriate 
summation of the states’ rebuttal burden.  See supra note 83. 
132 See Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102.  It is important to acknowledge that necessity, like non-
wantonness, is distinctly a feature of determining penological interests and not 
proportionality or standards of decency.  The Eighth Amendment “requires, in part, an 
inquiry into whether a punishment is excessive, and that inquiry has two aspects. . . .  First, 
the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.  Second, 
the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”  Taylor, 
487 F.3d at 1079 (internal citations omitted).  Wantonness or cruelty is a separate feature of 
gratuitous punishment than non-necessity and unusualness, and the former requires at 
least deliberate indifference.  See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).  “[I]n any given 
§ 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; 
and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim.”  
Id. at 330.  But see Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Workman v. Bredesen, 
486 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2007); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006); supra 
notes 133, 138, 163, 213-214.  The prevailing test for deliberate indifference is from Wilson v. 
Seiter: first, direct, particularized harm or substantial risk of harm, that harm being a 
serious injury by contemporary standards of decency; second, the state defendant’s 
culpable state of mind, which is a requirement for actual or reasonable knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of the condition and not necessarily maliciousness.  501 U.S. 294 (1991); see 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (discussing active commission of deliberate 
indifference); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (requiring a prima facie showing of 
particularized injury; discussing passive denial as deliberate indifference); Nelson, 541 U.S. 
at 645 (vindicating a claim for gratuitous punishment as the basis for a Section 1983 claim). 
 Rather than address in depth the idea of deliberate indifference, the purpose of this 
Note is instead to explore the necessity aspect of capital punishment, and for that reason 
the question of whether plaintiffs can prove cruel intent, by no means an uncontroversial 
issue, is set aside.  Some states and authorities, post-Hill, have said that inmates cannot 
prove deliberate indifference in the states’ usage of various lethal injection protocols and 
therefore that at least the cruel component of unconstitutional punishment does not exist, 
others that proving intentional indifference may be impertinent if states’ procedures have 
manifest deficiencies, and others still that the punishment is torturous, promotes lingering 
death, or causes psychological torture.  See supra note 98 (noting these opposing viewpoints 
on the cruelty component); supra note 55 (torture is inherently indecent).  What this Note 
does address is the substance of excessiveness—whether, if a practice creates substantial 
risks, it is justified by sufficiently tailored and legitimately necessary means to override an 
inmate’s preservation of whatever rights are not required by legitimate penological 
objectives, his status as a prisoner, or the punishment itself.  See supra notes 20, 81 and 
accompanying text. 
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infliction of pain—core behavior prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment.133 
The essential distinction between penological objectives which 
validate the punishment and those which justify conditions of 
confinement “that do[] not purport to be punishment” is that of 
necessary and unnecessary pain.134  Justifiably, the former category tends 
to receive deference, since a certain amount of pain and suffering inheres 
in being forcibly put to death.135  In the latter category, however, 
deference to retained prisoners’ rights is more likely, because conditions 
of confinement, unlike the ultimate punishment awaiting death row 
inmates, are not or must not be themselves intended by states and 
correctional officials as instruments of cruel and unusual pain and 
suffering.136  Excessive punishment is not justified by prisoner status per 
se, reflecting a presumption in favor of Eighth Amendment rights as 
                                                 
133 See supra note 8 (quoting Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 279 (1972)); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2101-02 (methods which are not required by statute or 
which as a matter of fact have alternatives are not “necessary”); Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644-46; 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (unusual punishment is not contemplated or not 
standardized).  See generally supra notes 2-15 (inferring the synonymy of the terms 
excessive, wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering, and unusual 
punishment); see supra note 132. 
134 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2204 (2007) (“[C]onduct that does not purport to be 
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care, inadvertence, or good 
faith error to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”).  Trop offered some aid in 
deciphering penological interests: 
If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment—
that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been 
considered penal.  But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it 
imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other 
legitimate governmental purpose. 
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96; see id. at 110. 
[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition is directed against cruel and 
unusual punishments.  It does not, by its terms, regulate the procedures 
of sentencing as opposed to the substance of punishment.  As THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE has observed, “[t]he prohibition of the Eighth 
Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the 
process by which it is imposed.” 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting, in part, Gardner 
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
135 See Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (stating that 
unconstitutional cruelty cannot logically include “cruelty inherent in the method of 
punishment . . . [that being] the necessary suffering involved”); supra note 24. 
136 See supra notes 20, 80-82 and accompanying text (describing that prisoners’ rights can 
only be deprived for legitimate penological reasons or because of prisoner status).  A 
Section 1983 action under Hill may challenge the lawful or factual validity of a condition of 
confinement, whereas alleging the invalidity of a punishment itself would be a hybrid 
claim sent to endure habeas rigors because of the Heck rule.  See supra notes 100, 108. 
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against injurious conditions of confinement until the punishment itself 
begins and unless specific Section 1983 allegations are met with specific 
penological justification.137 
The Court in Hill confirmed that the punishment of death, that 
portion of treatment justified by retribution and deterrence interests in 
habeas jurisprudence, only occurs in the very last moments of an 
inmate’s life.138  In Hill, an inmate was permitted to challenge the second-
to-last step of lethal injection protocol, that of Pavulon injection, as a 
“condition” or “circumstance” of confinement, even though Pavulon is 
introduced just moments before the injection of death-inducing 
potassium chloride or sodium thiopental.139  Hill stands for the 
proposition that the death penalty does not begin until the causation of 
death itself is induced in the form of a chemical which causes cardiac 
                                                 
137 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (noting that only the First Amendment 
has explicitly deemed status of a prisoner among the reasons for depriving rights, though it 
would appear that status-worthy treatment is really a sub-part of less clearly defined 
legitimate penological objectives governing inmates). 
138 See supra notes 95-97 (describing how and when Pavulon is implemented as the last 
step prior to death-inducing sodium chloride injection); Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 
(2006); supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (permitting a challenge to the use of 
Pavulon as an unnecessary component of the Florida lethal injection protocol).  See Walton, 
497 U.S. at 670.  But see Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004) (noting that the death 
penalty presupposes a means of carrying it out).  Nelson has been taken to mean two things 
about normal conditions of confinement cases: (1) that deliberate indifference (intent) is 
required to show a Section 1983 breach of legitimate penological objectives; and (2) that the 
protocol for lethal injection is part of the punishment itself because it is created by a 
Department of Corrections with sole authority to mete out the punishment authorized by 
statute or a sentencing judge.  Taylor, 487 F.3d at 1080-82 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300, 
302).  In those usual cases, the inquiry is apparently whether the risk of pain is 
unnecessary, rather than whether the components of the procedure are necessary.  
However, even Taylor acknowledged, as had Nelson and Hill, that the new conditions of 
confinement cases were unique.  Id. at 1080-81.  The situation with Pavulon is one that: 
does not fit neatly within the general conditions-of-confinement 
context because the conduct of which [one] complains is necessary to 
carry out his punishment, as opposed to a mere condition of his 
imprisonment. . . .  [T]his claim is not the typical conditions-of-
confinement claim challenging prison conditions in general nor does it 
involve the action of a particular officer that is not part of the 
designated punishment for the crime. 
Id. (citing Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644, which had difficulty categorizing this type of claim and 
reconciling it with traditional method-of-execution analysis).  Due to the uniqueness of the 
situation, therefore, courts disregard the usual limitations such as specific intent and 
pursue whether the necessary death penalty procedures carry substantial risks.  Id. at 1080. 
139 See supra notes 95-97, 106-07. 
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arrest.140  Only the last injection, the lethal injection, constitutes the death 
penalty punishment. 
Initially, to rebut an inmate’s allegation that any other condition not 
purporting to be punishment was gratuitously imposed, a government 
defendant need only produce some conceivable penological justification 
for the condition of confinement imposed or omitted.141  Nelson inferred 
this minimal burden of penological justification when it held that 
gratuitous circumstances of confinement preceding the execution 
punishment itself might be found cruel and unusual apart from casting 
judgment on the validity of the death penalty as a whole.142  Method-of-
execution analysis implies some threshold burden upon government 
officials, because standards of decency are to be balanced only against 
objectives befitting the modifiers “legitimate,” “penological” 
objectives.143  Furthermore, a showing of penological interest is the 
constitutional minimum expected when depriving prisoners of otherwise 
retained constitutional rights in First Amendment conditions of 
confinement cases.144 
Notwithstanding these numerous inquests for penological objectives 
alone, it must be stressed that the public official’s bar is not very high; 
the rationale offered at this stage need only be a legally sufficient reason 
                                                 
140 See Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).  This approach fits 
squarely within Eighth Amendment condemnation of gratuitous (meaning surplus) or 
unnecessary pain and suffering. Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2102.  Were a condition of confinement 
not necessitated by penological interests, it would at least be gratuitous, if not thereafter 
cruel pain or suffering as well.  The Court in Hill legitimated bifurcation between necessity 
and cruelty when, in determining the Eighth Amendment issue, it held that the use of 
Pavulon was not necessary (that is, a penological necessity) to the state execution 
procedure and remanded for a determination on the issue of whether inmate Hill could 
more than likely succeed on the merits (that is, whether there was a substantial risk of 
gratuitous pain and suffering).  126 S. Ct. at 2100-02; see supra note 132 (explaining the 
bifurcated approach of this Note); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 902-03, 919 (6th Cir. 
2007) (discussing the virtues and drawbacks of one, two, and three-chemical execution 
protocols); infra note 175 (explaining that the punishment only includes sodium thiopental 
(anesthesia) and Pavulon (muscle relaxant) to potassium chloride for other, non-
punishment reasons: the former to ensure unconsciousness and the latter to mask the 
appearance of convulsions and prevent confusion of witnesses, to preserve the dignity of 
the inmate and the process, and to ensure non-resuscitation). 
141 This framework is borrowed from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973), which governs Title VII intentional discrimination in the employment context and 
has not generally been used in Section 1983 jurisprudence; see supra note 132. 
142 541 U.S. 637, 645 (2004) (emphasis omitted). 
143 See supra note 29 (concerning the balance between decency and objectives). 
144 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974); see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying 
text. 
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for imposing a condition of confinement, not the actual reason.145  
Penological state interests are by definition presumed legally sufficient, 
because legislatures are bound by the Constitution and laws when they 
promulgate criminal punishments and operate correctional systems.146 
In response to such reasonable requirements from state defendants, 
government officials have nonetheless waged various doomsday 
assertions forecasting that conditions of confinement claims would open 
the floodgates to improper inmate claims.147  However, the PLRA places 
limits on conditions of confinement claims ascribed in Nelson and Hill 
and quells the need for fear, whether in frivolous or malicious cases or 
where damages or injunctive relief would be otherwise inappropriate.148  
Indeed, a prisoner’s prima facie claim must still specifically allege a 
substantial risk of unnecessary pain, particularized harm, and a specific 
condition of confinement which threatens both.149  If the preliminary 
government burden comports with reason, precedent, and public 
concern, inmates will only succeed in alleging unconstitutional risks in 
the first instance where state defendants offer no penological justification 
whatsoever for the same specific feature of confinement protocol. 
                                                 
145 See supra note 141; supra note 55 (referencing CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 18, for 
the proposition that a punishment must at least be authorized by law to be necessary); supra 
note 25 (noting Granucci, supra note 23, as saying necessary punishment is proven, codified 
punishment). 
146 See, e.g., supra note 20; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).  See Rhodes v. Chapman, 
452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981). 
[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are 
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal 
function in the criminal justice system: to punish justly, to deter future 
crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved 
change of being useful, law-abiding citizens. 
Id. 
147 See Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649; Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (2006); Weinstein 
& Dolan, supra note 93. 
148 Nelson, 541 U.S. at 649-50 (speaking to an equitable presumption against manipulation 
and unnecessary delay by claimants); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2104; see supra notes 104, 106 
(highlighting that this case was controlled by Nelson and only expanded upon it, so both 
applied PLRA limits under Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 749 (2004)); supra notes 100, 
109-10, 126 and accompanying text (listing relevant PLRA provisions and the effect on 
Section 1983 actions). 
149 Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2096 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)), which 
deemed preliminary injunctive relief unavailable unless the aggrieved party, by a burden 
of persuasion, demonstrates the significant possibility of success on the merits).  See supra 
notes 7, 134 (concerning the deliberate indifference standard for showing substantial risk of 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
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1. Retribution 
Despite the fact that the state defendant’s rebuttal burden is quite 
low, certain interests will not be penological in conditions of 
confinement situations and, thus, should not survive a facial challenge 
that they are gratuitous or unnecessary.  Retribution, although a 
penological justification for capital punishment itself, cannot 
simultaneously be a penological justification for non-punishment 
conditions of confinement.150  Retribution is merely a reason for bringing 
prisoners to a certain kind of justice.151  It asserts a legislative interest in 
the proportionality of the death sentence for various crimes and 
criminals rather than a legislative or correctional interest in particular 
conditions or practices prior to executions.152 
Moreover, retribution is too dangerous an interest to be permitted to 
pass this stage of conditions of confinement determination.153  Ideally, 
method-of-execution analysis places ever-enlightened public standards 
of decency as the first line of defense against rampant invocation of the 
penological retribution of right.154  However, society as a whole is also 
capable of devolving standards of decency and of consequently 
persuading the judiciary to offer a merciless solution.155  A better 
                                                 
150 See supra notes 80-82, 134.  Retribution, while one of the goals of the penal function 
according to Rhodes, is not one of the goals of the corrections system, according to Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).  Trop declared that penal functions are those aiming 
at punishment, quite apart from other legitimate interests which are non-penal in function.  
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96, 110.  In Walton, Justice Scalia, concurring, also recognized the 
distinction between punishment and process.  Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 277, 670 (1990). 
151 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (deeming retribution a “social 
purpose[]” for the death penalty). 
152 See supra note 150; supra Parts II.B.2-3 (discussing proportionality and retribution 
under habeas). 
153 For instance, so long as retribution is justified as something the government deserves 
to do rather than something simply within its legitimate powers, the basis for retribution 
borders on some perceived divine right, which can never be trumped.  Governments which 
believe they do not wield the sword in vain or otherwise taking “an eye for an eye” tend 
toward authoritarian systems of government.  See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 
31; supra note 62 (contrasting Biblical and theological support for “eye for an eye” 
governmental rights with Jesus’ apparent repudiation of such behavior); DRIMMER, supra 
note 62 and accompanying text (on the idea of deserving). 
154 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (laying out method-of-execution analysis and 
how, according to Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), it generally works to measure 
either proportionality or legitimate penological interests against standards of decency but 
not proportionality and penological interests against one another). 
155 See, e.g., Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 61 (public bloodlust and desire to 
humiliate convicts); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (public opinion more than anything drives 
standards of decency); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (noting how mob justice 
is often at the ready if governments’ handling of executions is unsatisfactory); Ewart, supra 
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safeguard against wanton and unnecessary conditions of confinement is 
the concept of legitimate penological objectives itself, one that poses an 
independent barrier to vengeful, cruel, and unusual conditions of 
confinement not attendant to death itself.156  Unlike standards of 
decency, the definition of penology does not purport to evolve or 
devolve at the social whim.157 
Furthermore, no pre-conceived penological legislative objective 
could be implemented if cruel, unusual, and unconstitutional on its 
face.158  In all instances of conditions of confinement, the Eighth 
Amendment in its very words “cruel and unusual” implies that, were it 
legitimate and penological, retribution must at least be implemented by 
dispassionate government officials, with the end of death alone and not 
wanton or unnecessary pain and suffering.159  Acceding accidents alone, 
lawful retribution does not qualify as a penological justification for 
alleged prisoner maltreatment prior to the actual punishment 
sanctioned.160  Any condition of confinement which does purport to be 
                                                                                                             
note 36, at 1162 (noting how shifts or maturation in the public mindset have carried this 
country from method to method of execution and from punishment to rehabilitation foci); 
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 29 (giving one example of that mob justice); Domino 
& Boccaccin, supra, at 73, 74 (hypothesizing that victims’ family members may want to 
observe executions in part to fulfill vengeful fantasies); Gardner, supra note 66, at 117 
(introducing retributional maximum pain proponents); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (explaining an angry public’s proclivity for “vengeful ‘self-help’”); 
supra note 22 (discussing the Kemmler execution, the first one done by electric chair, as 
flowing from court acquiescence to the public’s whimsical motivations). 
156 See supra notes 39, 155 (highlighting the possibility of devolved standards of decency 
in society, especially under contemporary standards of decency criteria). 
157 See supra notes 20, 134, 150 (providing support for the premise that penology itself is a 
timeless reference to a static concept within criminology).  Even though generations may 
differ as to what interests constitute penological ones or may forfeit consideration of 
penological objectives altogether, the term itself is ubiquitous and inalterable. 
158 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879).  Congress or state legislatures 
similarly cannot constitutionally project penal, punishment-driven objectives upon non-
penal, non-punishment conditions of confinement.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 96. 
159 See Kearns, supra note 5, at 228-29.  “[T]he death penalty . . .  must not be a celebration 
of horrific violence and revenge.  It is supposed to be the ‘mere extinguishment of life.’”  Id. 
at 299 (citing Wilkerson, 99 U.S. 130 and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1891)).  Trying to 
subject an executee to as much pain as his or her victims must have suffered is out of the 
question under the Eighth Amendment.  See Gardner, supra note 61, at 117 (regarding 
maximum pain proponents). 
160 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (mentally detached officials).  For the act to 
have been deliberate with a culpable mindset, the subjective recklessness showing must 
demonstrate actual knowledge of wrongfulness on the part of the prison official, including 
deliberate failure to protect an inmate if need be.  E.g., McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 
188 (6th Cir. 1990).  See, e.g., Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding 
that forcible confinement within a small cell without opportunity for exercise was 
particularly wrongful deliberate indifference); supra note 132 (about the deliberate 
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punishment but was not a prisoner’s actual sentence, much less one that 
serves no penological purpose related to the status of prisoners, is 
gratuitous under Nelson and Hill and should bow to prisoners’ retained 
rights.161 
C. Legitimate Necessity: Penological Objectives Assessed as Applied 
Once a court is satisfied that the government defendants have 
produced some penological justification for causing otherwise cruel and 
unusual conditions of confinement, that court must entertain whether 
the rationale was a legitimate reason for depriving prisoners’ rights.162  
The death row inmate would have to prove that the penological 
interest(s) offered were improper as applied—a mere pretext for some 
actual, unsavory objective motivating the condition of confinement, or 
else excessive and unnecessary.163  If penological justification was the 
legal sufficiency of conditions imposed, then legitimacy is their factual 
sufficiency, a question of whether the challenged conditions of 
confinement are rational under the circumstances.164  If the inmate 
                                                                                                             
indifference standard generally); see also Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.2d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(acknowledging that accidents cannot be constitutionally prohibited).  But see supra notes 
134, 138; infra notes 163, 213-14. 
161 See supra note 134 (discussing what purports to be punishment); Price v. Johnston, 334 
U.S. 266, 285 (1948); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 825-26 (1974) (treatment warranted 
by status of prisoners); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 645-47 (2004); Hill v. McDonough, 
126 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (2006) (discussing how gratuitous means unnecessary); supra note 18 
and accompanying text (concerning the principle of prisoners’ retained rights).  See, e.g., 
Hill, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (challenging usage of Pavulon as an established, or at least foreseeable, 
element of the Florida lethal injection protocol based on past practices in the state). 
162 See supra notes 107, 126 (describing how the Court in Hill and Nelson distinguished 
circumstantially or legally necessary conditions of confinement from not strictly necessary 
conditions). 
163 See supra note 159.  In an example provided by the film THE GREEN MILE, (Warner 
Bros. 1999), a corrections official, with his own emotional or financial incentives, did not 
wet the sponge which is placed on a prisoner’s head during an electrocution to assist the 
electrical current, the end result being a horrifically painful and slow death.  Wantonness 
requires deliberate indifference, and deliberate indifference of correctional officials or 
higher state officials requires intent to disregard a substantial risk of harm to an inmate.  
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844-47 (1994).  Nevertheless, “the other benchmark the 
court uses to identify Eighth Amendment violations [is] whether the punishment involves 
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”  Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 907 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645) (emphasis added).  Unnecessary punishment, as 
already discussed, is synonymous with gratuitous and has no prerequisite of intent, nor is 
it certain that cruelty is synonymous with deliberateness and thus requires intent.  See supra 
notes 23, 132; supra note 138 (highlighting how the court in Taylor, interpreting Nelson, 
believed the usual specific intent requirement should be set aside in death penalty 
conditions of confinement cases). 
164 See supra notes 52, 62 (noting where the Courts in Gregg and Furman, respectively, 
explained arbitrary jury proportionality determinations at the sentencing stage by favoring 
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cannot disprove a legitimate penological interest, then the circumstances 
should warrant deference to the penological interest proffered.165  
Illegitimate penological interests in the death penalty context may be 
legitimate government interests for the bulk of a prisoner’s confinement 
conditions but irrational as applied in the execution chamber and to 
lethal injection procedures specifically.166  Deterrence is a basic 
penological interest to First and Eighth Amendment precedent, as is 
administrative necessity in conditions cases.167  Each of these penological 
objectives nonetheless carry various arbitrary connotations in modern 
implementation when compared to death row inmates’ rights. 
1. Deterrence 
Deterrence is one among many penological objectives that can be 
either legitimate or illegitimate as applied.168  Deterrence from capital 
crimes has traditionally been most successful and legitimate when the 
public is emotionally and physically involved in capital punishment.169  
                                                                                                             
the death penalty over imprisonment); Kearns, supra note 5, at 200 (describing how the 
relatively small number of method-of-execution claims in over a century makes 
determining what is arbitrary or unreasonable in Eighth Amendment cases difficult). 
165 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003) (considering a valid, rational connection 
between a regulation and legitimate government interests behind it).  The existence of 
obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but the 
regulation need not be the least restrictive in order to survive scrutiny.  Id.  “[W]e cannot 
‘invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve 
the ends of penology.’”  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (quoting Furman, 408 
U.S. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting)).  But see Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2103 (not requiring the 
prisoner challenging a feature of execution protocol to offer a substitute, because, although 
in Nelson the inmate did offer central line procedure as an alternative to cut down 
procedure for venous access, Nelson did not require it nor heighten Section 1983 pleading 
requirements). 
166 See supra notes 70, 129 and accompanying text (commenting on inapplicability of 
special deterrence and rehabilitation state interests as applied to death row inmates, to the 
extent that their treatment differs from that of other prisoners).  “[S]ince most offenders 
will eventually return to society, another paramount objective of the corrections system is 
the rehabilitation of those committed to its custody.”  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 
(1974) (implying that an interest in a prisoner’s rehabilitation is conditioned on his or her 
expectable return to society). 
167 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (where, in an Eighth Amendment habeas case, deterrence was 
called one of the primary social purposes of the death penalty); Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-23 
(explaining that, in a First Amendment Section 1983 case, deterrence is one of the legitimate 
penological interests of the corrections system); see supra note 131 (explaining the concept 
of administrative necessity). 
168 See supra notes 71, 72 and accompanying text (commenting on the disputable power of 
capital punishment’s deterrent effect in various contexts and for various audiences). 
169 See Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3 (describing how citizen involvement has 
historically abated the likelihood of vigilantism).  “Political and religious leaders of the day 
were well aware that citizen support for the execution process was essential to the 
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Public executions provided a lawful panacea for public anger and 
psychological closure following heinous crimes, a societal consolation 
prize for direct retribution against criminals.170  Accessibility to and 
oversight of capital punishment was also a historically necessary 
precondition for responsible state governments who wanted to earn and 
keep the public confidence.171  Today, however, two of the government’s 
own designs—private execution statutes and Pavulon in lethal injection 
protocols—illustrate states’ tendencies to mitigate the death penalty’s 
deterrent value.172 
Although private execution statutes divested the public of death 
penalty oversight only at its own request, they have simultaneously 
created a legal chasm between those citizens and the likelihood of their 
being deterred by capital punishment.173  Even assuming that the few 
                                                                                                             
maintenance of public order and law-abiding behavior.  Without this support criminal and 
vigilante acts would possibly propagate.”  Id. at 62.  “[C]rime and consequence” was an 
important message conveyed just prior to each scheduled public execution.  Id. at 63.  
Attendees were warned not to view their task as witnesses as simply an enjoyable 
experience but as a social duty.  Id. 
170 See Gardner, supra note 61, at 113-18 (considering retributional expression of moral 
outrage); Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 73-74 (highlighting initiatives led by victims’ 
families to observe executions and their expectation of “moral closure” from viewing a 
criminal’s death). 
171 See generally supra note 34 and accompanying text (making this observation in the trial 
context). See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 30 (quoting Weisberg, supra note 44): 
Televised executions would mark the reversal of the 
process . . . whereby executions have been removed further and further 
from the community that compels them.  Through the eighteenth 
century, executions were atavistic spectacles performed in full public 
view.  In the nineteenth [century] they were moved inside the prison 
yard and witnessed by only a few.  In the twentieth century, 
executions moved deep inside the bowels of prisons, where they were 
performed ever more quickly and quietly to attract minimal notice . . . .  
Invisible executions shocked the sensibilities of fewer people, and 
dampened the momentum of the reform movement. 
Id.  But see Domino & Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 62 (noting that some, like eighteenth 
century activist Benjamin Rush, were convinced that public displays of discipline would 
lead to sympathy for the offender and criticism of government). 
172 See supra note 35 (explaining the rise and scope of private execution statutes, or 
otherwise repealed public execution statutes, in more detail); supra notes 95-96 and 
accompanying text (describing how Pavulon and like chemicals operate and why their use 
in lethal injection is challenged); Miller, supra note 47, at 231-32. 
173 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting that the move from public to private 
executions by law was instigated by either an increasingly squeamish or decent society).  
The fourth factor in standards for preliminary injunction is the public interest.  Workman v. 
Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 905 (6th Cir. 2007).  “In cases where the public interest is involved, 
the district court must also examine whether the public interest favors the plaintiff,” taking 
account of, in capital cases, states’ strong interest in carrying out their judgments.  Morales 
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witnesses who private execution statutes permit at executions are 
personally dissuaded from crime, these statutes imply by precondition 
that only a few law-abiding citizens and public officials will be invited to 
attend an execution, rather than a larger and more impressionable 
audience.174  This is not to say that privatized execution fails to serve any 
valuable penological purpose, just that governments have consciously 
sacrificed deterrence perhaps in the name of safety, other administrative 
necessities, or their perceptions of decency.175  Deterrence is an unlikely 
                                                                                                             
v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 
F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2005)).  As applied in most cases, erroneously, the public 
interest models verbatim only contemporary standards of decency and what legislatures 
hold to be true.  E.g., Workman, 486 F.3d at 906-07.  See supra notes 41, 42 and accompanying 
text.  Nevertheless, “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society . . . admits of few absolute limitations.”  Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1080 
(8th Cir. 2007).  Rejection of public oversight, oversight which is in the public’s best 
interests, ought to be the least of those limitations.  Following the Morales decision, 
Governor Schwarzenegger suggested that discussions about revamping the execution 
system pursuant to Judge Fogel’s order be kept candid, which has met with accusations of 
“shut[ting] Californians out of the debate over the death penalty.”  Bob Egelko, Bid for 
Public Discussion on Executions: Newspapers File to Prohibit Secretive Alteration of System, SF 
GATE, Feb. 1, 2007 (quoting Atty. Karl Olson), available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/02/01/BAGB8NSOEG1.DTL&hw=Bid+for+Public+Discuss
ion+on+Executions&sn=002&sc=1000.  “Florida Gov. Jeb Bush established an 11-member 
commission on the same day as Fogel’s ruling to meet publicly and propose changes in that 
state’s execution methods . . . .  Bush’s action refuted any claim by California officials that 
‘the review of the lethal injection procedure can flourish only in the dark.’”  Id.  (citing and 
quoting Atty. Karl Olson).  Moreover, California voters approved Proposition 59 in 2004, a 
state constitutional amendment requiring that public agency meetings and writings of 
public officials be open to public scrutiny.  Id.  Secrecy, it appears, is as “profoundly 
inimical” to the death penalty as it is to the trial process. See Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 448, 593, 597-98 (1980). 
174 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  Among the limited number of witnesses 
permitted in the small space of most death chambers, “most states currently allow a 
religious delegate, a physician, several individuals designated by the offender (e.g., family 
members, attorneys), and others selected by a corrections official (e.g., members of the press), to 
view an execution, though minors and other inmates are typically barred.”  Domino & 
Boccaccin, supra note 3, at 63-64 (emphasis added); see John D. Bessler, Televised Executions 
and the Constitution: Recognizing a First Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, in 45 
FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 362-64, 368-72, 369 (2000).  As of 2000, the only states to permit 
families of victims to observe the death sentence in progress were California, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.  Domino & Boccaccin, supra 
note 3, at 66. 
175 See Workman, 486 F.3d at 902-03, 919 (discussing the virtues and drawbacks of one, 
two, and three-chemical execution protocols); surpa note 95.  According to the courts that 
have reviewed it, “the whole point of the Tennesee lethal-injection protocol is to avoid the 
needless infliction of pain, not to cause it.  The idea is to . . . cause[] a quick and pain-free 
death.”  Id. at 907.  Upon closer examination, however, masking involuntary movements is 
obviously motivated by a mixture of penological and decency interests, rather than pain-
aversion.  It is a means to prevent “interfe[rence] with the proper functioning of the IV 
equipment and [to] contribute[] to the dignity of the death process,” a humane death.  Id. at 
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justification for any particular condition of confinement when so very 
few people are permitted to observe them. 
In the same manner that private execution statutes make the threat 
of death less credible, the paralytic agent Pavulon disengages witnesses 
from being deterred by the harsh reality of death.176  Unlike private 
execution statutes, however, Pavulon is a specific condition of 
confinement that an inmate can challenge for substantially risking 
gratuitous harm.177  The sole purpose of this drug is apparently to 
present an inmate’s death in somatic form for witnesses, as more of a 
peaceful sleep than a potent, conscience-jarring event.178  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                             
909, 918.  Of course, a fundamental principal of penological interests is that “[t]he State, 
even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human 
beings.  A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human 
dignity.”  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-71 (1972).  Tennessee retained Pavulon 
largely because it would “typically result in involuntary movement which might be 
misinterpreted as a seizure or indication of consciousness.”  Workman, 486 F.3d at 903.  
Such convulsions are “a phenomenon the State understandably wished to avoid out of 
respect for the dignity of the individual and presumably out of respect for anyone, 
including the inmate’s family, watching the execution.”  Id. at 909.  A side effect of 
respectfully fooling people is to shield them from the horror that enables deterrence.  
Furthermore, Pavulon is not entirely viewed as a humane additive for dignified purposes.  
As an added measure, Pavulon also conveniently prevents respiration, which is touted to 
help ensure that an inmate, though potentially suffering, doesn’t retain consciousness.  
Henry Weinstein & Dolan, supra note 93, at 3. 
176 Lethal injections which use Pavulon make death appear “so denatured and 
mechanistic as to be unshocking even to most live witnesses.”  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra 
note 18, at 31.  At most, to assess an inmate’s stability through the fog of Pavulon-induced 
paralysis, some states rely on heart monitors or camera observation by medical or 
corrections officials sitting outside the death chamber in order to determine the nearness to 
and moment of a prisoner’s death.  Id.  (observation by camera); Kearns, supra note 5, at 
220, n.225 (procedures for carrying out an execution by lethal injection) (heart monitors); 
see supra note 93.  According to Michael Kroll of the Death Penalty Information Center, 
inability to watch televised executions, like being denied personal access to executions, is 
one more layer of removal from the process that undermines the gravity of death by lethal 
injection.  See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 72. 
177 Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006). 
178 See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper Collins 1932) (a novel in 
which soma is a drug that all of society takes to remain in a placid, blissfully ignorant 
frame of mind, in part to make their continual implementation of discrimination, slavery, 
and euthanasia more palatable).  Dr. Heath of Columbia University has remarked: “It’s 
hard to see what the role of pancuronium is in an execution.”  Witt, supra note 93, at 8.  
Judge Ellen Hobbs Lyle, during the course of one such Tennessee case, opined that, as a 
worst-case scenario, the drug was motivated by the “state’s interest in demonstrating to 
witnesses that the death penalty procedure is painless . . . .  ‘The subject gives all the 
appearances of a serene expiration when actually the subject is feeling and perceiving 
excruciating painful ordeal of death by lethal injection.’”  Id.  Thus, the pancuronium 
bromide, according to Judge Lyle, “gives a false impression of serenity to viewers, making 
punishment by death more palatable.”  Id.  Indeed, Attorney General Dane R. Gillette, 
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even for witnesses and public officials personally observing a lethal 
injection, Pavulon promotes only benign and incidental effect on the 
criminal conscience.179 
Death row inmates and the public have a common interest in 
rejecting the supposed dignity and predictability Pavulon offers, and 
unresponsive legislatures ought not to be allowed the deference to 
sanction a procedure so illegitimately employed.180  Pavulon is 
challenged because it induces paralysis, making it nearly impossible for 
execution technicians, much less the attending public, to decipher and 
act upon physical clues to botched executions as compared to those 
executions that stay within constitutional bounds.181  As long as Pavulon 
or any kind of chemical or physical veil is used, witnesses cannot 
observe procedural inadequacies and prompt public officials to rework 
alleged gratuitous deficiencies in the lethal injection protocol.182  Like 
private execution statutes, Pavulon marginalizes public involvement in 
the death penalty.  To the extent that either type of device is used, 
                                                                                                             
during the course of the Morales trial, said that use of a single drug overdose would be 
ugly, slow, and not pretty to watch.  Weinstein & Dolan, supra note 93, at 3.  This interest is 
quite different than a purported interest in preserving a prisoner’s dignity.  See supra note 
177. 
179 In an essay titled “Reflection on the Guillotine,” Albert Camus relayed what truly 
intentional deterrence would look like: 
If the penalty is intended to be exemplary, then, not only should the 
photographs be multiplied, but the machine should even be set on a 
platform in Place de la Concorde at two p.m., the entire population 
should be invited, and the ceremony should be put on television for 
those who couldn’t attend.  Either this must be done or else there must 
be no more talk of exemplary value.  How can a furtive assassination 
committed at night in a prison courtyard be exemplary?  At most, it 
serves the purpose of periodically informing the citizens that they will 
die if they happen to kill—a future that can be promised even to those 
who do not kill.  For the penalty to be truly exemplary, it must be 
frightening. 
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 29. 
180 See, e.g., supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of an 
evolving standards of decency approach). 
181 See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006); supra notes 93, 176 
(noting that heart monitors and video cameras make it more likely that attendants will 
recognize execution problems, but not that those methods are better than firsthand 
observation); COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 87 (describing how, in a perfectly 
executed lethal injection, witnesses’ only physical clue in the midst of an inmate’s paralysis 
is the sound of that person’s tongue dropping back in the person’s throat upon death). 
182 See supra notes 32, 36 (public’s power to affect change in standards of decency and 
consequently states’ methods of execution).  Even though the media or other witnesses are 
limited to word of mouth or print publication of what they have observed, documentation 
of botched executions can still hold governments accountable for their practices. 
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governments would seem to lack a penological interest in the 
punishment’s deterrent value, much less the deterrent value that those 
lesser-included components such as Pavulon bring to the execution 
procedure. 
2. Administrative Necessity 
States have numerous legitimate penological interests vested in 
lethal injections protocol and other related conditions of confinement.183  
Legislatures themselves tend to assume some broad oversight over the 
death penalty, enacting statutes like the AEDPA or PLRA to maintain 
efficient capital punishment and restrict non-meritorious prisoner 
claims.184  Additionally, Hill held that penological necessity includes 
lethal injection procedures which, as a matter of law or fact, are integral 
to the punishment.185  Chief among legitimate penological interests in the 
death penalty is legislative deference to a Department of Correction’s 
administration as the vehicle for effectuating the state’s penological 
interests in death penalty particulars.186  Departments of Correction in 
turn may authorize any lawful and administratively necessary 
penological decisions with the force of law.187 
Current circumstances, however, indicate that administrative 
implementation of the death penalty is marred by non-transparency, bad 
                                                 
183 See supra note 126.  Chief among state interests in their considered lethal injection 
protocols, or any one feature of those protocols, is saving legislative, judicial, and agency 
resources and costs which would incur each time all or a portion of the execution method is 
deemed unconstitutional.  Nelson, 541 U.S at 644, 650. Additionally, states’ ultimate 
punishments may lose some of their deterrent and retributive power each time their 
methods are constitutionally embarrassed in the courts.  See supra notes 60, 66, and 
accompanying text. 
184 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (AEDPA); supra notes 109-10 (PLRA). 
185 Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-03.  Through means of the Heck rule and the 
PLRA, the Nelson Court preserved habeas-like deference to states’ deliberately chosen 
death penalty methods and protocols in conditions of confinement cases.  Nelson, 541 U.S. 
at 646-650. 
186 E.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1(d) (2006) (Indiana); Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2100 (Florida); 
Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005) (Tennessee). 
187 See supra note 186; Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644 (“imposition of the death penalty 
presupposes a means of carrying it out”).  In response to the contention that Department of 
Corrections protocols in other states should not be considered strong evidence for 
contemporary standards, the court in Abdur’Rahman said that protocols necessarily follow 
from enacting legislation in which legislatures establish methods of execution.  
Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.2d at 306; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(c) (West 2006) (“The 
department of correction is authorized to promulgate necessary rules and regulations to 
facilitate the implementation this section”); see also IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1(d) (enabling the 
Indiana Department of Corrections discretion to implement regulations consistent with its 
lethal injection statute); supra note 83. 
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faith discovery, inadequate executioner training and screening, and other 
forms of clandestine irresponsibility which can neither legitimately 
purport to be penological, administrative necessity, nor to prevent 
serious Eighth Amendment risks to death row inmates.188  The first layer 
of failed administrative necessity, although not the cause in fact of 
gratuitous conditions of confinement, is a lack of legislative oversight.189  
Legislatures which summarily authorize capital punishment by statute 
have deferred rather standardless discretion to the Departments of 
Correction officials who enact those punishments, disclaiming any duty 
of ongoing legislative and public oversight of capital punishment 
protocols.190 
The greatest need for legislative and public oversight is in areas 
where Departments of Correction appear inept at lethal injection 
implementation, aspects which no amount of regular walk-through 
procedures or remote video monitoring of executions alone could 
correct.191  Most noticeably, execution technicians are dependent on 
medical professionals or at least their own medical aptitude.192  Because 
much-needed medical practitioners tend to ethically recuse themselves 
from participating in lethal injection, corrections officials, often without 
                                                 
188 E.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Miller, supra note 
47, at 231-32; see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
189 See Abdur’Rahman, 181 S.W.3d at 312 (quoting one court’s refusal to impose public 
opinion and formal requirements on lethal injection procedures which, in its 
understanding, only concerned inter-correctional activities); supra notes 88-89. 
190 See supra notes 83, 86-89, 93; Gordon, supra note 2, at 362-63, n.41. 
191 See supra notes 93, 98, 176, 181.  States which believe death row affords a lesser 
standard of care than in medical practice believe these measures are justified by security 
concerns.  Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007).  Bureaucratization of 
the process makes both blame and responsibility exceedingly hard to place.  The account of 
an execution official in charge of flipping the electric switch at the botched execution of 
Jesse Joseph Tafero shows that no official is independently allowed to end the procedure; 
even though the official noticed torture in progress, he only turned the switch on and off as 
directed while Tafero’s head roasted.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 84. 
192 See supra notes 47, 97, 130.  Doctors face a dilemma: being ethically barred from 
participation or leaving the procedure in the hands of less competent personnel, who will 
likely increase the risk of needless suffering.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 107.  
Dr. Ralph Gray opted to be integral to the first lethal injection—of Charles Brooks in Texas 
in 1982.  He even monitored Brooks’ heartbeat by stethoscope.  Id.  But see supra note 47 
(noting that, in states where the standard of care is reduced, the general consensus is that 
properly trained correctional officers are permitted to perform anesthesia and monitor an 
inmate’s lethal injection in lieu of medical professionals). 
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medical training or guidance, have occasionally botched the technically 
demanding components of those executions.193 
Less obviously, states have generally not formalized their lethal 
injection protocols into documented rules or regulations, providing 
themselves some insulation from not only potential liability and 
embarrassment but also from greater public oversight and inmate 
access.194  The practice of statutorily excluding lethal injection protocols 
from administrative publication in turn encourages correctional higher-
ups to be content with under-documented and non-peer-reviewed 
performance criteria for lethal injection protocols.195  Some protocols, as 
noted, are never even reproduced out of the handwritten notes of the 
correctional officers who use them.196 
These practices offend the traditions of public oversight at 
executions and public trials as well as the discovery needs of death row 
inmates.197  Prisoners attempting to challenge execution protocol on 
                                                 
193 See supra note 47 (describing why medical professionals feel it unethical to assist in 
capital punishment); supra note 130 (noting the California Attorney General’s view that 
without willing medical personnel present, lethal injection is practically impossible); Miller, 
supra note 47, at 231-33 (describing one estimate of the number of botched executions and 
their causes by 2001); supra note 48 (discussing failed executions).  Nevertheless, sometimes 
the interest in security and in having correctional officials at a distance seems to make 
sense.  Workman, 486 F.3d at 909-10.  In 1988, Raymond Landry was to be executed when 
his intravenous chemical lines burst and sprayed all over witnesses and technicians who 
were close to the inmate’s body.  COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 18, at 104. 
194 See supra notes 34, 80-82 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 
181 S.W.3d 292, 311, 312 (Tenn. 2005). 
[A] ‘rule’ does not include ‘[s]tatements concerning only the internal 
management of state government and not affecting private rights, 
privileges or procedures available to the public, nor does a ‘rule’ 
include ‘statements concerning inmates of a correctional facility’ . . . .   
[W]e have previously held that the Department of Correction’s prison 
disciplinary procedures were not ‘rules’ under the UAPA . . . .  
Accordingly, we conclude that the procedures in the lethal injection 
protocol were not ‘rules’ adopted by the Department of Correction in 
violation of the UAPA and that the petitioner is not entitled to relief on 
this ground. 
Id.; see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.  But see Richmond Newspapers v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571, 597-98 (oversight expected in the courtroom). 
195 See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Miller, supra note 47, at 231-
33; supra notes 87-89, 92 and accompanying text.  But see Workman, 486 F.3d 896. 
196 See Gibeaut, supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra notes 34, 64 and accompanying text (traditions of public oversight at 
executions and of oversight at trials); see also Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (“Defendants 
still have not fulfilled their discovery obligations.”); Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 
919 (6th Cir. 2007) (“An examination of best practices from other jurisdictions . . . suggests 
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Eighth Amendment grounds encounter the difficult task of obtaining 
access to these unpublished and unreproduced original state manuals.198  
If death row inmates gain access to these materials, their previously 
speculative fears of inexpertise and non-penological state directives may 
well be vindicated.199  What is more, inmates may only be able to access 
lethal injection protocol descriptions in the manner currently intended 
by their State when the time left for filing a Section 1983 or habeas claim 
is dangerously close to the eleventh hour.200  At that point, courts have 
often dismissed claims which only temporary stays of execution could 
resolve without realizing that the true motivation behind late appeals, 
upon some deeper digging, might be the genuine lack of prior 
opportunities.201 
Thus, not all administrative and legislative assumptions can justly be 
termed legitimate penological necessities. Without formal avenues for 
auditing the qualifications of lay executioners, poorly performed 
                                                                                                             
that accountability would be enhanced through improved documentation of these 
processes.”). 
198 See supra note 107.  “On November 29, 2005, the Governor of Florida signed Hill’s 
death warrant, which ordered him to be executed on January 24, 2006.  Hill requested 
information about the lethal injection protocol, but the department provided none.”  Hill, 
126 S. Ct. at 2100.  The Hill court said Mr. Hill could not have access to the same procedural 
documents, but had to rely on the portions described in Sims instead.  Id.  Without the same 
kind of access, Hill’s complaint could do no better than requesting preliminary injunction 
“barring defendants from executing Plaintiff in the manner they currently intend.”  Id. 
199 See Miller, supra note 47, at 231-32. 
[M]any states have clandestine execution procedures.  Some states 
allow witnesses to view executions, and these witnesses often become 
the reporters of botched executions . . . because of the drugs used in 
lethal injections, witnesses may not be able to observe that a prisoner is 
in severe pain. 
Id. 
200 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting the AEDPA’s purpose is to bar 
unduly delayed attempts at equitable relief).  Compare Hill, 126 S.Ct. at 2100 (lethal injection 
execution), with Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of California, 503 
U.S. 653 (1992) (per curiam) (execution by cyanide gas).  When Clarence Hill was sentenced 
on November 29, 2005, his scheduled execution date was January 24, 2006.  Hill, 126 S. Ct. 
at 2100. The Court in that case saw the delay as an abusive eleventh hour attempt to 
manipulate equitable remedies.  Id.  In Gomez, though the result was the same, the Court 
noted that petitioner’s claim “could have been brought more than a decade [earlier].”  
Gomez, 503 U.S. at 654. 
201 E.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that 
additional time for discovery and evidentiary matters and a hearing on the merits was 
warranted, because when Mr. Taylor brought suit, the State’s intended procedure for lethal 
injection was unwritten; the district court failed to set Mr. Taylor’s hearing on the merits in 
a timely manner, and when the hearing was eventually held, it was held in an unjustly 
expedited manner). 
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executions could continue unabated.202  Unprofessional documentation 
might save the states from potential embarrassment or Section 1983 
challenges, but neither reason is a legitimate objective.203  Opposing these 
less than honorable interests is a prisoner’s right of timely access to the 
courts, uninhibited by nontransparent protocols, as well as a tradition of 
public accountability whereby the people and the press act as checks on 
arbitrary government action and as vigilant voices for humane execution 
improvements.204  On the balance, non-transparency of death penalty 
operations, the access to which would otherwise legally or morally be in 
the prisoner and public interest, cannot be claimed as legitimate.205 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The approach of this Part is to adapt the aforementioned analysis 
into a value-added method-of-execution test for death row prisoners’ 
Section 1983 and Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims.  
While modeled after the preeminent habeas method-of-execution 
analysis, the test that follows also incorporates the essential aspects of 
Nelson and Hill analysis, namely the hybrid rule from Heck, PLRA 
limitations, and the prima facie requirement for a substantial risk of 
harm, commonly determined by deliberate indifference or comparable 
ignorance standards.206  It differs from core habeas Eighth Amendment 
interpretations in that it addresses a death row inmate’s unique showing 
of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in conditions of 
confinement cases, overrides a death row inmate’s constitutional rights 
                                                 
202 See Miller, supra notes 47-48 (citing the number of known botched executions between 
1993 and 2001 and their likely causes). 
203 See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that there is no 
substitute for first-hand observation, whether standardized or not, nor sufficient reason to 
accept substitutes). 
204 See supra notes 34, 64, 197. 
205 Compare Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (“At the present time . . . .  Defendant’s 
implementation of California’s lethal-injection protocol lacks both reliability and 
transparency . . . .  This is intolerable under the Constitution.”), with Abdur’Rahman v. 
Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311-12 (Tenn. 2005) (“The protocol instead fits squarely within 
two exceptions to the meaning of ‘rule’: statements concerning only the internal 
management of state government and not affecting private rights privileges or procedures 
available to the public . . . . and statements concerning inmates of a correctional or 
detention facility”). 
206 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (method-of-execution analysis, generally); 
supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (describing the present Nelson/Hill analysis for 
death row inmates’ Section 1983 claims); supra notes 132, 160 (explaining why cruel intent, 
while set aside for the purposes of analysis in this Note, is nevertheless important to many 
final determination of cruel and unusual punishment); supra notes 138, 163, 213-14 and 
accompanying text (urging the view that excessiveness assumes ignorance or non-
necessity). 
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only where legitimate penological objectives so suggest, and weighs only 
those legitimate, penological objectives against evolving standards of 
decency to determine whether cruel and unusual punishment has taken 
place.207  The aim of this model judicial reasoning is to increase 
governmental responsibility for the means they employ in executing 
felons.208  It does not unavoidably cast judgment on capital punishment 
itself, only on the level of discipline and expertise that capital 
punishment jurisdictions ought to employ, with the aid of improved 
public oversight. 
A. The Proposed Test: Combining Hill with Method-of-Execution Analysis 
The first requirement of the proposed test is that death row inmates’ 
alleged conditions or circumstances of confinement challenges satisfy the 
basic requirements common to both the AEDPA and PLRA.  If the 
challenge is frivolous or malicious, posits a claim for which there is no 
relief, names an immune defendant, is taken prior to administrative 
exhaustion, or commits some other basic error, it should, as in current 
practice, meet its early demise on the authority of either of these 
statutes.209  If the claim comes in the eleventh hour, on the other hand, 
courts should not presume the plaintiff is improperly motivated by 
earning a temporary stay of execution in contravention of the AEDPA or 
PLRA.210  The court may find at a later stage in this test that the state has 
simply failed its discovery obligations, either by not publishing its 
procedures and protocols in easily accessible form or perhaps by being 
                                                 
207 See generally supra Part III; see supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining core 
habeas actions, as distinct from hybrid actions and conditions of confinement actions under 
the Heck rule). 
208 At least one post-Hill decision has approached the issue of death row inmates’ Section 
1983 claims in this way. 
Defendants’ implementation of lethal injection is broken, but it can be 
fixed . . . .  California’s voters and legislature repeatedly have 
expressed their support for capital punishment.  This case thus 
presents an important opportunity for executive leadership . . . .  
Should Defendants wish to retain a three-drug protocol, which it most 
certainly is their right to do, they must address in a serious way the 
broader structural problems in implementation outlined in this 
memorandum. 
Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974, 982, 983-84. 
209 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (AEDPA); supra notes 100, 109-10, 126 
(PLRA). 
210 See supra notes 75, 197, 200 (comparing state interests in timely executions with inmate 
access to necessary discovery materials). 
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otherwise belligerent in withholding limited sources of information from 
inmates interested in physical evidence.211 
Second, the plaintiff must present a prima facie case, what Hill called 
“substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” under Section 1983 and 
the Eighth Amendment.212  Proving a deprivation under color of the 
Eighth Amendment freedom from cruel and unusual punishment is 
appropriate, according to Nelson, when a showing of deliberate 
indifference to that constitutional right is made, though negligent 
indifference might suffice as well.213  Deliberate indifference may be the 
infliction of improper conditions of confinement or the omission of 
humane conditions owed, which encompasses at least a sort of reckless 
ignorance.214 
The third step requires that the baseline state interests be penological 
interests for implementing the specifically challenged aspects of an 
execution procedure.215  The state defendant only needs to produce some 
penology-based rationale for his actions in rebuttal of the prima facie 
allegations.216  Some hybrid claims will part ways from the test at this 
point and be assessed instead under traditional method-of-execution 
analysis if the inmate challenges the one and only permissible method 
and protocol for a state’s executions under its laws.217  Foreseeably, states 
may use this opportunity provided by Nelson to write one specific 
method into their statutes to avoid Section 1983 lawsuits.218  But if a state 
has, in bad faith, authorized only one method of execution in its statute, 
its interest would be strictly non-penal rather than penological and still 
not survive this stage of this test if challenged.  
                                                 
211 See supra notes 88-89, 194-96, 198, and 200-01 (each discussing, in part, states’ efforts to 
conceal their lethal injection protocols). 
212 See supra notes 111-12 (discussing the demonstration that might be required to show a 
risk of gratuitous harm). 
213 See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) (deliberate indifference); supra notes 
138, 163 (something less than intent in Taylor and negligent indifference in Workman, 
respectively); supra note 133.  See generally Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 972. 
214 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) 
(deliberately indifferent cruel and unusual punishment commission and by omission, 
respectively); supra note 132. 
215 See supra Part III.B. 
216 See supra notes 132, 141 and accompanying text (state’s baseline rebuttal burden of 
production). 
217 Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645.  See generally supra notes 100, 103-04, 108 (distinguishing 
permissible methods from possible methods). 
218 See Kearns, supra note 5, at 211. 
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Fourth, an inmate must establish that the penological interests 
offered were not legitimately applicable to the circumstances of 
confinement under review.219  Proof that the penological interests were 
illegitimate under the circumstances—that is, that they were a mere 
pretext for cruel and unusual punishment—would mean that a prisoner 
retains his Eighth Amendment rights and may potentially be entitled to 
injunctive relief, damages, or otherwise under Section 1983, aside from 
remedies attendant to the Eighth Amendment substantively.220  Hybrid 
claims which have challenged the factual validity of the death penalty 
might exit the test at this point and be bound for a habeas determination; 
however, courts using this test may as well not force the issue, since part 
five of this test is the same next step as in pre-Penry method-of-execution 
analysis—Trop and Roper’s evolving standards of decency.221 
The final part of this test is used when the governmental justification 
appears to be thoroughly legitimate and penological. Unless the inmate 
has proven his case for negligent, reckless, or deliberate indifference 
previously, legitimate penological interests should earn the substantial 
deference usually enjoyed under comparable habeas method-of-
execution analysis.222  The legitimate penological interests are then 
balanced against standards of decency to determine a death row 
inmate’s last chance for vindication.223  For various reasons, “evolving 
standards of decency” is more appropriate to this test than 
“contemporary standards of decency.”224  Measuring legitimate 
penological interests that have already surpassed the rigors of parts one 
through four of this test against contemporary standards would tend 
toward a non-event—the two things are virtually indistinguishable 
legislative determinations in reality.225  When measuring evolving 
                                                 
219 See supra Part III.B. 
220 Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (stating that injunctive and monetary 
relief are available under Section 1983); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974) 
(further describing when retroactive monetary relief is available). 
221 See supra notes 38, 43 (highlighting the factors in Trop/Roper evolving standards of 
decency). 
222 See supra notes 60, 66, 126, 183 (describing rationale for deference). 
223 See supra note 111 (referencing common tests of merits balanced against relative 
hardships). 
224 See supra notes 38-39, 42, 173 and accompanying text (offering a basic comparison of 
the two frameworks, the advantages of evolving standards of decency, and its relationship 
to the most up-to-date and best public interests). 
225 E.g., Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d. 292, 306 (Tenn. 2005).  In the case of 
Pavulon, if the state deems its usage legitimate and penological, contemporary standards 
would simply confirm that result, because Pavulon is used in all but two lethal injection 
death penalty jurisdictions.  Id.  That case, using a now obsolete analysis after Hill, 
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standards, however, it is at least possible that courts could bring their 
own judgment to bear to find a condition of confinement inherently cruel 
and unusual, though having technically survived the previous test as a 
legitimate penological interest.226 
B. Some Forthcoming Implications of the Proposed Test 
The proposed test implies several alterations to lethal injection as 
currently employed, including correctional systems’ reliance on Pavulon, 
private execution statutes, undocumented lethal injection procedures, 
and inexperienced executioners.  The overall goal of the test is to 
encourage increased governmental accountability for capital punishment 
by stricter enforcement in courts, statutes, rules, regulations, and lethal 
injection protocols themselves.227 
Courts, for their part in ensuring a move towards transparency and 
professionalism, should, first, no longer permit retribution or deterrence 
to be balanced against standards of decency as legitimate penological 
rationale for the methods or procedures of execution employed, except to 
the extent that executions are indeed made so sufficiently public as to 
support deterrence rationale.228  Second, courts, in conjunction with other 
branches of government, can and should make executions more publicly 
accessible, because private execution statutes may be incompatible with 
deterrence, much less the traditions of public oversight, of retributional 
moral balance, and of evolving standards of decency in conditions of 
confinement cases.229  Third, courts can and should find unconstitutional 
the use of paralytic agents like Pavulon and any other gratuitous or 
excessive execution features lending to unusual punishment if they are 
also, cruelly, not remedied.230 
Rather than wait for courts to exhaust the Pavulon issue, a proactive 
legislative commitment to professionalism in death penalty 
                                                                                                             
permitted even non-legitimately justified means where most states said the means were 
still contemporarily decent.  Id. 
226 See Coker v. Georgia, 438 U.S. 584, 597 (1977); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 
(2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2003) (each stating that the Court’s judgment 
“is” or “will be” “brought to bear” in Eighth Amendment cases); supra notes 39, 43. 
227 Overall, the goal ought to be implementation of at least the “best practices” of all U.S. 
jurisdictions.  See Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 919 (6th Cir. 2007). 
228 See supra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1; supra note 175 and accompanying text (on valuing 
deterrence). 
229 See supra Part III.B. 
230 See Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 
(N.D. Cal. 2006); Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006). 
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administration can save face for jurisdictions where currently there are 
concealed, inadequate operations.231  The potential for litigation and 
embarrassment can be powerful incentive to perfect humane execution 
procedures and accommodate public oversight, both of which enforce 
the traditional concept of evolving decency.  States’ protocols for 
execution should be put down in rule or regulation form to give the 
public easier access and fulfill discovery obligations to inmates.  Better 
inmate access, in particular, advances both AEDPA and PLRA goals, 
since it would enable prisoners with meritorious claims to more clearly 
avoid the appearance of eleventh hour stay of execution opportunism.  
Additionally, all executioners should be subject to more stringent 
training requirements.  Because medical professionals cannot be forced 
to participate, courts conceded that properly trained correctional officials 
may perform the task alone.232  States should then focus on honing the 
technical skills of elite groups of dispassionate execution officials in the 
proficient use of standardized protocols. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Capital punishment, as an institution, is not remotely coming to an 
end in this country. Realizing that the punishment itself is as yet 
constitutional, many death row inmates have tried desperately to 
challenge the means by which they will be brought to their ends.  This 
approach has revealed more deficiencies in execution procedures than 
were perhaps expected.  In particular, this Note describes how Section 
1983 claims disputing the conditions of prisoner confinement not only 
suggest that the nation’s best procedures ought to be standardized in 
order to eliminate the substantial risk of excessive suffering, but it 
requires a probing inquiry into the justifications for each stage of the 
death penalty process.  State and federal governments should subject 
death row inmates to only those conditions which protect the inmates’ 
best interests and promote transparency to the public. Any feature that is 
not strictly necessary ought to be justified solely by legitimate 
                                                 
231 As noted previously, Tennessee and California are states that have taken or are taking 
such steps semi-proactively.  See Workman, 486 F.2d at 899 (explaining in detail the lethal 
injection improvements in Tennessee); Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75 (describing the 
court-ordered improvements in California procedure); Witt, supra note 93, at 8. 
232  Because an execution is not a medical procedure, and its purpose is not 
to keep the inmate alive but rather to end the inmate’s life . . . the 
Constitution does not necessarily require the attendance and 
participation of a medical professional.  However, the need for a 
person with medical training would appear to be inversely related 
to . . . reliability and transparency. 
Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 983. 
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penological interests.  For the sake of dignity and decency, and in 
accordance with our rules of law, we cannot abide by the inhumanity of 
indifference or shallow objectives which, by design or in effect, subject 
even our vilest offenders to worse treatment than is sanctioned by the 
worst punishment available under law.233  The only truly responsible 
goal for death penalty conditions of confinement is an aim of legitimate 
penological objectives, and it can be accomplished through a new 
understanding of prevailing principles which the nation’s maturing 
standards and laws have come to rely upon. 
Daniel R. Oldenkamp234 
                                                 
233  “The mood and tempter of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and 
criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country.”  Melvin 
Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a Mutual Accommodation, 1992 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 857 (1992) (quoting Winston Churchill, 1912). 
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